FREE MINDS FOR THE MIDDLE EAST
Tuesday, April 22, 2003
Fadlallah and Hizbullah
For an interesting insight into the intricacies of Iraqi Shiite politics, Juan Cole, a professor of Middle East and South Asian history at the University of Michigan, has prepared this useful primer for Middle East Report Online.
However, one of Cole's passages is partly inaccurate. He writes: "[M]any in the Iraq al-Da'wa are loyal to Lebanese Hizballah leader Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah. Fadlallah was born and educated in Najaf, going to Lebanon only in 1965. Hizballah has threatened violence against US troops in Iraq."
Fadlallah is not a "Hizballah leader", though he did once serve as a "spiritual guide" to the group in the 1980s, when Hizbullah was still a motley collection of gangs, before an Iranian-imposed reorganization later in the decade. Not only does Fadlallah have no place in the party hierarchy, he has had deep differences with the party in recent years, both for political and doctrinal reasons. Fadlallah, like many Najafi clerics, is opposed to the Wilayat al-Fakih, or "Guardianship of the Jurisconsult", concept which Khomeini advanced to combine clerical and political power in the same ruler. Hizbullah is not, and has hitched its wagon to Khomeini's successor, Ali Khamenei.
Fadlallah and Hizbullah are also potential competitors if they decide to appeal to the large new Shiite "electorate" in Iraq, though their approaches are very different. Fadlallah is an erudite cleric, having been the representative in Lebanon of the late Grand Ayatollah al-Kho'i, and his authority is based on his learning. As a Najafi, he also has an advantage over Hizbullah, which does not seem to have established any real network in Iraq. Hizbullah, in contrast, has little strictly religious legitimacy, being seen much more as a successful political organization.
There is also a generation gap: Fadlallah is getting on in years and his health has been uncertain, according to reports. Hizbullah's leaders, in contrast, are young and on the upswing. To put Fadlallah and Hizbullah in the same basket is a mistake, even if they might have parallel interests when it comes to challenging American power in Iraq.
Monday, April 21, 2003
Some figures
Like a cheap telethon MC, I can now report to readers (at least those who haven't accessed the site meter) that after a month of operation, BC is just a few days away from the 10,000 visits mark. I suspect quite a few of those were me trying to see if the market was bullish or bearish. But a few others were readers actually displaying interest in an otherwise amateurish effort, so now is the time to thank one and all, particularly those who took the trouble to link the site.
Readers might be interested in my latest contribution to Slate's International Papers column, in which I dutifully persue (mostly) the Middle East press in search of meaning. This offering is, so to speak, a tale of three governments: Lebanon's new government, Iraq's future government, and the Palestinians' delayed government.
Gotta run
According to an article in the Palestinian Al-Quds daily, citing American officials, the U.S. has provided the Syrian authorities with clear evidence that Iraqi officials have escaped to Syria. The paper also noted the Bush administration had given the Syrians a list of 9 names of ex-officials it wanted Syria to return to Iraq.
Among those on the list were Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, ex-vice-president of the Revolutionary Command Council; Abed Hammoud al-Takriti, Saddam's former private secretary and among the most powerful people in Iraq; Hani Talfah, the head of the Special Security Organization; Seifeddine Saleh, the former head of the presidential guard; Taher Jalloul, the former head of the Iraqi intelligence service (Mukhabaraat); Barzan Suleiman al-Takriti, formerly in chagre of internal security in Saddam's personal bodyguard; and Farouq Jamazi, the former external intelligence chief.
According to the American sources, the Syrians rejected the U.S. demands. However, yesterday Saddam's remaining son-in-law, Jamal Mustafa Abdallah Sultan al-Tikriti, returned to Iraq from Syria. It is conceivable that this was a sign that Syria wants to solve the problem of the Iraqi exiles quietly: i.e. publicly stand up to the U.S., but privately begin sending people back. Or, it could be something more subtle: Syria's way of setting a limit on the level of officials it will protect, so that members of Saddam's family are off limits, but other former Iraqi officials are not.
As a footnote, Hammoud's alleged presence in Damascus raises questions. First of all, Hammoud was always where Saddam was and appeared in the footage of Saddam's two last public appearances in Baghdad--one allegedly as late as April 9. If Hammoud is in Syria, it could mean the Saddam footage was fake, since Hammoud presumably did not skip out of Baghdad on April 9, with Saddam still alive and U.S. forces surrounding the city, and run off to Syria. Or it could mean the U.S. list is simply mistaken. It could also mean other things that we have far too little information to speculate about.
Saturday, April 19, 2003
Here is a commentary I published in today's Daily Star on the new Lebanese government. Further proof, as I argued in the previous posting, that the Arab world generally reacts to potentially positive change by battening the hatches. We now have a government of apparatchiks in Beirut.
Opportunities gained or lost?
My friend Chuck Freund has written this commentary for Reason, where he argues that the defeat of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq might also signal a defeat for Pan-Arabism and victory for liberal forces in the Middle East.
Here is his opening paragraph:
The fall of Baghdad this month was accompanied by another event that was less visible but that has potentially far greater consequences: the collapse of Pan-Arabism as an essential and controlling aspect of Arab political thought. Because the triumph of Pan-Arabism half a century ago led to the eclipse of liberal thought in the Arab world, Pan-Arabism's collapse may well make room for liberalism's gradual return in the region's discourse. That could in turn allow the region to break its historic cycle of political failure and economic stagnation. If that occurs, it would be a clear--if perhaps paradoxical--case of liberal interests advanced and served by military means; the true victors of the overthrow of Iraqi Ba'thism would be the long-powerless Arab liberals.
That would be great news. The only problem is that the Arab world tends to respond to its defeats not by opening up but by closing down and falling back on the old ways--no matter how discredited they may be. Witness this genuinely pathetic commentary by Edward Said in the English-language portion of the Al-Hayat website, which utterly fails to see the advantages the Arabs might derive from Saddam's fall.
Witness, too, the fact that what begins as a fairly serious commentary soon becomes petty as Said turns his piece into yet another attack on Fouad Ajami and Bernard Lewis (or maybe it's just the same one he keeps recycling). Said, like Candide, invariably prefers to cultivate his little garden of recrimination.
My friend Chuck Freund has written this commentary for Reason, where he argues that the defeat of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq might also signal a defeat for Pan-Arabism and victory for liberal forces in the Middle East.
Here is his opening paragraph:
The fall of Baghdad this month was accompanied by another event that was less visible but that has potentially far greater consequences: the collapse of Pan-Arabism as an essential and controlling aspect of Arab political thought. Because the triumph of Pan-Arabism half a century ago led to the eclipse of liberal thought in the Arab world, Pan-Arabism's collapse may well make room for liberalism's gradual return in the region's discourse. That could in turn allow the region to break its historic cycle of political failure and economic stagnation. If that occurs, it would be a clear--if perhaps paradoxical--case of liberal interests advanced and served by military means; the true victors of the overthrow of Iraqi Ba'thism would be the long-powerless Arab liberals.
That would be great news. The only problem is that the Arab world tends to respond to its defeats not by opening up but by closing down and falling back on the old ways--no matter how discredited they may be. Witness this genuinely pathetic commentary by Edward Said in the English-language portion of the Al-Hayat website, which utterly fails to see the advantages the Arabs might derive from Saddam's fall.
Witness, too, the fact that what begins as a fairly serious commentary soon becomes petty as Said turns his piece into yet another attack on Fouad Ajami and Bernard Lewis (or maybe it's just the same one he keeps recycling). Said, like Candide, invariably prefers to cultivate his little garden of recrimination.
Sahhaf is a doll
By this time most people will have learned that a Muhammad Saeed al-Sahhaf doll has been built by Herobuilders, a Connecticut doll-making company. Not to put too intellectual a veneer on things, but we should applaud the ecumenism of the market, ever willing to convert a former enemy into profits.
What a splendid way to punish the boys of Baghdad: make loads of money off of them, and avoid paying them licensing fees.
By this time most people will have learned that a Muhammad Saeed al-Sahhaf doll has been built by Herobuilders, a Connecticut doll-making company. Not to put too intellectual a veneer on things, but we should applaud the ecumenism of the market, ever willing to convert a former enemy into profits.
What a splendid way to punish the boys of Baghdad: make loads of money off of them, and avoid paying them licensing fees.
Ball and chain
Sporting aficionados might wish to consult this Guardian article on Uday Saddam Hussein's treatment of Iraqi football players, and reflect on the true meaning of hooliganism.
A passage:
Any player knows the pain of missing a penalty, but for a member of the national team, it carried the certainty of ritual humiliation, imprisonment, and torture. Only three Iraqis dared to take penalties, and Zair was one of them.
"Many of the footballers refused to even touch the ball, but then we realised that if no one accepted we would all be punished," the midfielder said.
He missed. Two days after the team returned to Baghdad, Zair was summoned to the headquarters of the country's Olympic committee, the lair of Uday Hussein, eldest son of Saddam and the leading personality in Iraqi sport.
He was blindfolded, and taken away to a prison camp for three weeks. He shrugged: "End of story."
Friday, April 18, 2003
Decapitate, legally
My friend Chibli Mallat, who has turned pursuing foreign heads of state for their war crimes into a high art, has just published the first of a two-part commentary in the Daily Star (Beirut).
He opens:
One of the many missing pieces in American strategy in Iraq is how to deal with the leaders of Iraq if and when they are caught. While “decapitation” is an integral part of the effort toward regime change, the policy is legally questionable in the absence of any indictment of those being targeted.
The new Lebanese government has been announced, peppered with a wholesome dose of pro-Syrian apparatchiks. Tomorrow I will link BC up with a commentary I wrote for the Daily Star on the new outfit. You can hardly wait, I know, the cabinet is that interesting...
However, I wonder when the Syrians will opt for a different approach than the one adopted yesterday. When, for example, might they chose to use Lebanon as a hook to liberalize their own system, instead of using their system to close ours down?
However, I wonder when the Syrians will opt for a different approach than the one adopted yesterday. When, for example, might they chose to use Lebanon as a hook to liberalize their own system, instead of using their system to close ours down?
We bomb, we profit
The U.S. Agency of International Development has issued the first major reconstruction contract in Iraq to the Bechtel Group. A New York Times story reports: "The award will initially pay Bechtel, a closely held San Francisco company that posted $11.6 billion in revenue last year, $34.6 million and could go up to $680 million over 18 months."
Only a handful of large and well-connected U.S. companies (which will doubtless be happy to donate to Bush's election campaign) were invited to bid. Who will pay for Iraqi reconstruction? American taxpayers will pay initial contract costs, but Iraqi oil revenue is supposed to eventually pay for much of the reconstruction.
One of the more controversial aspects of the deal is that the U.S. doesn't want the U.N. to have any say in postwar Iraq, nor has it even given lucrative contracts to its ally Britain, inducing Tony Blair to recommend a larger role for the international organization. One unidentified American official caught the unilateral mood with this phrase:
"We are in control on the ground and creating facts on the ground, Iraq will not be put under a U.N. flag. The U.N. is not going to be a partner. And right now, people don't have the stomach to make a theological fight over this."
Facts on the ground? Theological fights? He sounded like he was talking about the West Bank.
The U.S. Agency of International Development has issued the first major reconstruction contract in Iraq to the Bechtel Group. A New York Times story reports: "The award will initially pay Bechtel, a closely held San Francisco company that posted $11.6 billion in revenue last year, $34.6 million and could go up to $680 million over 18 months."
Only a handful of large and well-connected U.S. companies (which will doubtless be happy to donate to Bush's election campaign) were invited to bid. Who will pay for Iraqi reconstruction? American taxpayers will pay initial contract costs, but Iraqi oil revenue is supposed to eventually pay for much of the reconstruction.
One of the more controversial aspects of the deal is that the U.S. doesn't want the U.N. to have any say in postwar Iraq, nor has it even given lucrative contracts to its ally Britain, inducing Tony Blair to recommend a larger role for the international organization. One unidentified American official caught the unilateral mood with this phrase:
"We are in control on the ground and creating facts on the ground, Iraq will not be put under a U.N. flag. The U.N. is not going to be a partner. And right now, people don't have the stomach to make a theological fight over this."
Facts on the ground? Theological fights? He sounded like he was talking about the West Bank.
Thursday, April 17, 2003
Tom Friedman wants to set Lebanon free. And here we were having such a great time. Spoil sport!
Republic of fear
Two important articles, one in the Washington Post (thanks to Chibli Mallat for the reference) another in the French daily Le Monde, on the entrails of the Baathist security state--both based on interviews and on party and intelligence documents found in the aftermath of the collapse of Saddam's regime. The Post has a long article on the Mother of All Battles branch of the Baath Party in Basra, Le Monde on the journalist's tour of the former General Security (Amn al-Aam) building in the Roussoufiyya district of Baghdad. Edifying.
Kiss our ass
James Schlesinger has written a commentary of towering stupidity in today's WSJ Opinion Journal. It's entitled "Political Shock and Awe: We've won a war--and taught the Middle East a lesson". What's the argument? It boils down to "We are the strongest, don't fuck with us, the Arabs tried, they lost, all the catastrophes they promised before the war didn't happen, and the press and Europeans were idiots for thinking they might."
Here are two paragraphs:
Many have argued that greater self-criticism or better understanding of the roots of terrorism would magically dispel the hostility displayed in much of the Arab world. This was reflected in widespread demonstrations as we responded to 9/11 in Afghanistan; pervasive sympathy for, as well as some direct support of, bin Laden; celebration of 9/11 itself; constant anti-American whining in the Arab press; and a steady flow of critiques from Arab governments (albeit sometimes primarily for domestic consumption.)
There is a notable diminution of the earlier braggadocio. The many-heralded "catastrophes" did not take place. There was no "explosion" in the Middle East, no widespread unrest immediately upsetting governments, no endless urban warfare, no heavy casualties, no use of chemical and biological weapons (which Saddam supposedly did not have). What we have seen instead is a stunned realization of an awesome display of military power.
So, what's wrong with that? Nothing, except that if that's the level of strategic debate that Schlesinger and his friends at the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board are engaging in, then we might as well, all of us, invest in a bunker in Tasmania. Where does this line of reasoning take us? Not very far. Schlesinger glorifies military power, applauds Arab fear, and doesn't even bother to see whether all that force can be used, with other policy instruments, to transform Middle Eastern societies into more open affairs.
Stand aside Rush Limbaugh....
James Schlesinger has written a commentary of towering stupidity in today's WSJ Opinion Journal. It's entitled "Political Shock and Awe: We've won a war--and taught the Middle East a lesson". What's the argument? It boils down to "We are the strongest, don't fuck with us, the Arabs tried, they lost, all the catastrophes they promised before the war didn't happen, and the press and Europeans were idiots for thinking they might."
Here are two paragraphs:
Many have argued that greater self-criticism or better understanding of the roots of terrorism would magically dispel the hostility displayed in much of the Arab world. This was reflected in widespread demonstrations as we responded to 9/11 in Afghanistan; pervasive sympathy for, as well as some direct support of, bin Laden; celebration of 9/11 itself; constant anti-American whining in the Arab press; and a steady flow of critiques from Arab governments (albeit sometimes primarily for domestic consumption.)
There is a notable diminution of the earlier braggadocio. The many-heralded "catastrophes" did not take place. There was no "explosion" in the Middle East, no widespread unrest immediately upsetting governments, no endless urban warfare, no heavy casualties, no use of chemical and biological weapons (which Saddam supposedly did not have). What we have seen instead is a stunned realization of an awesome display of military power.
So, what's wrong with that? Nothing, except that if that's the level of strategic debate that Schlesinger and his friends at the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board are engaging in, then we might as well, all of us, invest in a bunker in Tasmania. Where does this line of reasoning take us? Not very far. Schlesinger glorifies military power, applauds Arab fear, and doesn't even bother to see whether all that force can be used, with other policy instruments, to transform Middle Eastern societies into more open affairs.
Stand aside Rush Limbaugh....
Virus warning
Just received the following from the Lebanese Council of Women (who for some reason have me on their mailing list). You might want to filter the doctor's heated tone and the obvious editorializing (for example the genocide comment), but the allegation, if true, merits attention. I post the letter as is, without knowing who Dr Mahdi speaks for:
The Central Infectious Diseases Laboratory in the heart of Baghdad has been broken into, looted and smashed. Incubators containing many dangerous viruses, including hepatitis, polio, AIDS and many other have been stolen and other containers and incubators have been smashed and strewn all over the area.
There is no public broadcasting service to warn the looters and others of the dangers, and no authorities to take action. Some of the Lab workers have been pleading with ICRC officials and with American military medics to rise up to their responsibilities, but they appear to have been stonewalled.
They believe that this will cause major outbreaks of disease.
Please act urgently. Contact the ICRC, aid agencies, media, politicians. This war is turning into genocide while politicians and the military congratulate each other.
The Lab workers themselves stress that the diseases will not spare the occupation troops themselves.
Dr Kamil Mahdi
University of Exeter
Just received the following from the Lebanese Council of Women (who for some reason have me on their mailing list). You might want to filter the doctor's heated tone and the obvious editorializing (for example the genocide comment), but the allegation, if true, merits attention. I post the letter as is, without knowing who Dr Mahdi speaks for:
The Central Infectious Diseases Laboratory in the heart of Baghdad has been broken into, looted and smashed. Incubators containing many dangerous viruses, including hepatitis, polio, AIDS and many other have been stolen and other containers and incubators have been smashed and strewn all over the area.
There is no public broadcasting service to warn the looters and others of the dangers, and no authorities to take action. Some of the Lab workers have been pleading with ICRC officials and with American military medics to rise up to their responsibilities, but they appear to have been stonewalled.
They believe that this will cause major outbreaks of disease.
Please act urgently. Contact the ICRC, aid agencies, media, politicians. This war is turning into genocide while politicians and the military congratulate each other.
The Lab workers themselves stress that the diseases will not spare the occupation troops themselves.
Dr Kamil Mahdi
University of Exeter
Nine lives
Barzan al-Takriti, Saddam's half-brother, has been found alive in Baghdad, following a report last week that he had been killed on his farm south of the Iraqi capital. Reportedly his family in Geneva put out the rumor that he had been killed so he could make a clean getaway. Speaking of which, this Washington Post article insinuates, though it doesn't confirm, that Saddam's cousin Ali Hassan al-Majid, or "Chemical Ali", may have escaped from Basra after all, despite reports of his death.
The relevant passage reads:
At one of Majeed's guesthouses, Mohammed Yahya, an unemployed 32-year-old, was scavenging recently for whatever the looters left behind. Yahya, who lives near the guesthouse on the banks of the Shatt al Arab waterway, said he saw a convoy of six or seven four-wheel-drive vehicles leave the compound early on April 6, heading for a northbound military road that cuts between palm trees close to the Iranian border.
Yahya, who said he often watched the comings and goings from the guesthouse, said the cars belonged to "some very important people." He added: "We don't know who occupied the cars. But it might have been Ali."
You've got to hand it to these Takritis. They sure know how to survive.
Wednesday, April 16, 2003
Make daddy proud
Here is a potentially serious timebomb in Syrian-American relations, and something to watch out for:
A suspected high-ranking operative of the Iraqi intelligence service [Farouq Hijazi] who is believed to have played a key role in a 1993 plot to assassinate then-US president George Bush was spotted in Syria Tuesday, after arriving from Tunisia, US officials said.
As promised yesterday, here is a link to an article I wrote today in Lebanon's Daily Star on some of the various conspiracy theories explaining why Baghdad fell so easily.
The never interesting Howard Kurtz has an otherwise useful item in his Media Notes column on Bill Clinton's criticism of George W. Bush's Iraq war.
Here is Mistah Kurtz being jocular:
"Bill Clinton is back on the warpath.
"You have to wonder about his timing."
Yawn
Here is Mistah Kurtz being jocular:
"Bill Clinton is back on the warpath.
"You have to wonder about his timing."
Yawn
Bashar forms a government
As everyone by now knows, the Lebanese prime minister, Rafik Hariri, resigned yesterday in order to form a new government. If you watched CNN, you might have heard the station mention that this had nothing to do with U.S. pressures on Syria. In fact it had everything to do with it.
According to various sources what will emerge is a "political" or "war cabinet" as the daily Al-Nahar called it. That means it will include a large number of political-communal heavyweights, including several presidential and prime ministerial contenders. Such a government serves several purposes:
First, it allows the Syrians to put several of their more influential allies back in the government and also broaden its base, at a time when there are fears in Damascus that the U.S. might try to sever the Syrian-Lebanese relationship. A broad government looks more legitimate, though it is also true that many of the people whose names are being bandied about are directly dependent on Syria for their influence--not on Hariri or the president, Emile Lahoud.
Second, the Syrians have created a government that will neutralize Lahoud and Hariri, whose disputes have shaped Lebanese politics since at least 2000. Both men aren't especially satisfied with the new makeup, seeing that they will have less influence (and loyal ministers) than they had. As one friend remarked, the possible inclusion of several Maronite presidential hopefuls might signal that Lahoud will not have his mandate extended or renewed in 2004, as he had hoped.
Third, this is a government broad enough to allow Syria several options, including putting a lid on Hizbullah if that becomes imperative, but also covering for a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, full or partial, if the Syrians see that as necessary to protect themselves to their east. In light of this one should watch to see what the Syrians will do in the coming weeks, as the U.S. will probably raise the heat on Syria to control Hizbullah and expel militant Palestinian groups based in Damascus.
The upside of the government is that Lebanon is better off with a structure that reflects the various political tendencies in the country, particularly if there is a confrontation with Hizbullah or change in the Syrian order in Lebanon. Under those circumstances, better a government Syria can trust, if only to prevent a backlash bred of mistrust that can harm Lebanon. The downside is that the government is one of stalemate, where everyone will neutralize everyone else. It will very likely last until presidential elections in summer 2004, which means that no economic reform will take place for at least another year, particularly privatization.
As everyone by now knows, the Lebanese prime minister, Rafik Hariri, resigned yesterday in order to form a new government. If you watched CNN, you might have heard the station mention that this had nothing to do with U.S. pressures on Syria. In fact it had everything to do with it.
According to various sources what will emerge is a "political" or "war cabinet" as the daily Al-Nahar called it. That means it will include a large number of political-communal heavyweights, including several presidential and prime ministerial contenders. Such a government serves several purposes:
First, it allows the Syrians to put several of their more influential allies back in the government and also broaden its base, at a time when there are fears in Damascus that the U.S. might try to sever the Syrian-Lebanese relationship. A broad government looks more legitimate, though it is also true that many of the people whose names are being bandied about are directly dependent on Syria for their influence--not on Hariri or the president, Emile Lahoud.
Second, the Syrians have created a government that will neutralize Lahoud and Hariri, whose disputes have shaped Lebanese politics since at least 2000. Both men aren't especially satisfied with the new makeup, seeing that they will have less influence (and loyal ministers) than they had. As one friend remarked, the possible inclusion of several Maronite presidential hopefuls might signal that Lahoud will not have his mandate extended or renewed in 2004, as he had hoped.
Third, this is a government broad enough to allow Syria several options, including putting a lid on Hizbullah if that becomes imperative, but also covering for a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, full or partial, if the Syrians see that as necessary to protect themselves to their east. In light of this one should watch to see what the Syrians will do in the coming weeks, as the U.S. will probably raise the heat on Syria to control Hizbullah and expel militant Palestinian groups based in Damascus.
The upside of the government is that Lebanon is better off with a structure that reflects the various political tendencies in the country, particularly if there is a confrontation with Hizbullah or change in the Syrian order in Lebanon. Under those circumstances, better a government Syria can trust, if only to prevent a backlash bred of mistrust that can harm Lebanon. The downside is that the government is one of stalemate, where everyone will neutralize everyone else. It will very likely last until presidential elections in summer 2004, which means that no economic reform will take place for at least another year, particularly privatization.
Tuesday, April 15, 2003
Syria gets breathing room
The Guardian is reporting that George W. Bush has spiked plans to go to war against Syria "and has blocked preliminary planning for such a campaign in the Pentagon..." This squares with information I heard that National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice also opposes a Syria campaign.
Meanwhile, Al-Jazeera, in its morning press review, cited an Al-Siyassa newspaper (not sure if they meant the Kuwaiti daily) to the effect that the Syrians were preparing plans for a full military withdrawal from Lebanon. I find the story doubtful as it is, even if I can imagine that the Syrians would be inclined to repatriate several thousand troops to defend against an American attack. However, Lebanon is about the only card the Syrians have left, and they won't abandon it so readily.
Baghdad plots
This morning Al-Jazeera quoted a Le Monde article which supposedly claimed that the fall of Baghdad was a result of a deal between the U.S. and the Republican Guard, and it repeated a story similar to what Beirut's Al-Mustaqbal published Monday (discussed in yesterday's posting), namely that Gen. Maher Sufyan (who was called Gen. Sufyan Jghayb by Al-Mustaqbal--perhaps Maher Sufyan Jgheib) had "reached an agreement with American forces in which he ordered his forces to surrender in exchange for his transfer via an American Apache helicopter to an undisclosed safe haven."
I checked out Le Monde's website and was unable to find such a piece, however. I have no explanation for this.
Another theory circulating has been advanced by the commercial intelligence company Stratfor, or Strategic Forecasts. Stratfor cited German intelligence sources as speculating that senior Iraqi officers and intelligence chiefs essentially handed over much of Iraq norht of Nasiriyya to the U.S., including Baghdad. They suggest that Saddam and his son Qusay were killed in the initial American “decapitation attack” that opened the war--thanks to inside information provided by some military officials on their whereabouts. Two officials, Taha Yassin Ramadan and Tareq Aziz, then allegedly led resistance efforts, but were later killed by the military chiefs who were paid off by the U.S. and allowed to flee.
These stories are fascinating, all the more so as there might be some truth in them. Then again, there might not. If readers are interested I have a column on the subject in tomorrow's Daily Star.
This morning Al-Jazeera quoted a Le Monde article which supposedly claimed that the fall of Baghdad was a result of a deal between the U.S. and the Republican Guard, and it repeated a story similar to what Beirut's Al-Mustaqbal published Monday (discussed in yesterday's posting), namely that Gen. Maher Sufyan (who was called Gen. Sufyan Jghayb by Al-Mustaqbal--perhaps Maher Sufyan Jgheib) had "reached an agreement with American forces in which he ordered his forces to surrender in exchange for his transfer via an American Apache helicopter to an undisclosed safe haven."
I checked out Le Monde's website and was unable to find such a piece, however. I have no explanation for this.
Another theory circulating has been advanced by the commercial intelligence company Stratfor, or Strategic Forecasts. Stratfor cited German intelligence sources as speculating that senior Iraqi officers and intelligence chiefs essentially handed over much of Iraq norht of Nasiriyya to the U.S., including Baghdad. They suggest that Saddam and his son Qusay were killed in the initial American “decapitation attack” that opened the war--thanks to inside information provided by some military officials on their whereabouts. Two officials, Taha Yassin Ramadan and Tareq Aziz, then allegedly led resistance efforts, but were later killed by the military chiefs who were paid off by the U.S. and allowed to flee.
These stories are fascinating, all the more so as there might be some truth in them. Then again, there might not. If readers are interested I have a column on the subject in tomorrow's Daily Star.
Sahhaf strung up?
Al-Bawaba is citing the Iranian Mardomsalari newspaper citing Iraqi refugees to the effect that former Iraqi information minister Muhammad Saeed al-Sahhaf hanged himself. Another Arabic-language Iranian paper said the same thing.
Al-Bawaba noted:
According to these reports, al-Sahaf hanged himself a few hours before Baghdad fell to US forces on April 9th. The refugees gave no source to confirm their claim.
That seems as unlikely a story as the one which said that American forces were committing suicide by the hundreds at the gates of Baghdad.
PS--The Guardian has picked up the story, which offers a bonus: another report from an Iranian newspaper that the fall of Baghdad was the result of a U.S.-Iraqi-Russian tripartitie deal.
Al-Bawaba is citing the Iranian Mardomsalari newspaper citing Iraqi refugees to the effect that former Iraqi information minister Muhammad Saeed al-Sahhaf hanged himself. Another Arabic-language Iranian paper said the same thing.
Al-Bawaba noted:
According to these reports, al-Sahaf hanged himself a few hours before Baghdad fell to US forces on April 9th. The refugees gave no source to confirm their claim.
That seems as unlikely a story as the one which said that American forces were committing suicide by the hundreds at the gates of Baghdad.
PS--The Guardian has picked up the story, which offers a bonus: another report from an Iranian newspaper that the fall of Baghdad was the result of a U.S.-Iraqi-Russian tripartitie deal.
Monday, April 14, 2003
Dead again
Al-Bawaba is reporting that Nizar Khazraji was "was assassinated Monday on his way to attend a U.S.-called meeting of opposition groups in the southern city of Nassiriya." The story doesn't cite a source and, for the moment, seems to merit as much skepticism as previous reports of his demise.
The website also has this story on the alleged departure for Syria of Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, of the Revolutionary Command Council, who had been ordered by Saddam to defend northern Iraq against U.S. forces. Reportedly, Izzat Ibrahim, who cleared out last week from the town of Kirkuk, took with him $30 million.
Al-Bawaba is reporting that Nizar Khazraji was "was assassinated Monday on his way to attend a U.S.-called meeting of opposition groups in the southern city of Nassiriya." The story doesn't cite a source and, for the moment, seems to merit as much skepticism as previous reports of his demise.
The website also has this story on the alleged departure for Syria of Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, of the Revolutionary Command Council, who had been ordered by Saddam to defend northern Iraq against U.S. forces. Reportedly, Izzat Ibrahim, who cleared out last week from the town of Kirkuk, took with him $30 million.
Crocodile Hussein
Saddam's hideaway found, including a "mirrored bedroom, lamps shaped like women, airbrushed paintings of a topless blonde woman and a mustached hero battling a crocodile" as well as "beanbag chairs, a garden of plastic plants, a sunken kitchen and a room for a servant, all 1960s-style."
See it and weep, here on CNN's website.
Conditions
Israel has begun to set conditions on Syrian behavior in the future, as it seeks to profit from growing hostility in Washington against the regime in Damascus. This from today's Ha'aretz:
Syria must lift the threat of Hezbollah attacks against Israel and expel the leaders of [Palestinian] terrorist organizations from Damascus, Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz was quoted as saying Monday, amid fast-rising tensions between Syria and the United States.
Meanwhile, Israeli foreign minister picked his spot to make an equally threatening statement. From Turkey, he said:
"Syria is letting terrorist organizations operate in the country ... Unfortunately they are not doing anything to prevent it. More than that, they are encouraging terrorist organizations to act within Syria all the time."
Israel to the south, (a halfhearted) Turkey to the north, and America to the east...One can only hope the Syrians don't respond to their west.
Israel has begun to set conditions on Syrian behavior in the future, as it seeks to profit from growing hostility in Washington against the regime in Damascus. This from today's Ha'aretz:
Syria must lift the threat of Hezbollah attacks against Israel and expel the leaders of [Palestinian] terrorist organizations from Damascus, Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz was quoted as saying Monday, amid fast-rising tensions between Syria and the United States.
Meanwhile, Israeli foreign minister picked his spot to make an equally threatening statement. From Turkey, he said:
"Syria is letting terrorist organizations operate in the country ... Unfortunately they are not doing anything to prevent it. More than that, they are encouraging terrorist organizations to act within Syria all the time."
Israel to the south, (a halfhearted) Turkey to the north, and America to the east...One can only hope the Syrians don't respond to their west.
Stabbed in the back
Revealing story on the front page of today's daily Al-Mustaqbal, owned by Rafik Hariri: a report from the ever gullible Najwa Qassem in Baghdad who spoke to an Iraqi major, Amer Fouad Ahmad. Most intriguing was his allegation that the fall of Baghdad was essentially the result of a deal cut between the U.S. and Saddam, a view inceasingly popular in the Arab world. Reportedly, before the Americans entered Baghdad a senior Saddam aide, Lt-Gen Sufyan Jghayb, flew around the city in an Apache helicopter to instruct Republican Guard units to step down.
The story is full of holes: for one thing, the officer mentions an extremely high number of deaths around Baghdad airport (13 survivors from a unit of 320), so that not all units seemed to be in on the "deal." But does that make sense? Presumably the Americans would have cut a deal to save their soldiers' lives, meaning all Iraqi units would have had to have been neutralized. Secondly, Ahmad has no direct evidence of Jghayb's shuttle. Third, his indirect evidence for a "deal" is that Iraqi units were told to evaluate the battle against the U.S. wherever they were, without recourse to central command, so that what ensued was chaos. But that decision could just as easily have been a result of poor leadership by the regime.
The tenor of the argument is that Saddam's regime and the Republican Guard cut a prior deal with the U.S., and the victims were the Iraqi Army and people. That seems a convenient way to absolve the Army of its responsibility for not fighting, and recourse to conspiracy theories is often how military men respond to setbacks. Having said that, to date we really have no clear account why the Iraqis so readily abandoned Baghdad. And things won't necessarily be helped by the American military's efforts to shape interpretation of the war to conform with its own interests.
In this context you might want to read John Broder's and Eric Schmitt's a long New York Times report yesterday which seemed to offer a solidly conventional (and entirely uncritical) version of the war, based almost exclusively on conversations with U.S. military personnel. Or you can try to catch what Tommy Franks told CNN's Wolf Blitzer on Sunday.
Sunday, April 13, 2003
Betting on Saddam
If you're ever in Monte Carlo betting on the numbers, make sure you don't have a Syrian or a Frenchman whispering advice to you, because if their wagering against the U.S. in Iraq was any indicator, you'll be lucky to go home wearing a fig leaf. There's something eerily similar in Syrian and French diplomacy towards the Iraq war: Both countries decided to lead the procession of protest against the U.S, other protestors were happy to let them lead, and all in favor of an Iraqi regime that was obviously on the way out.
The thought came to mind as U.S. defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld declared that several top Iraqi officials had escaped to Syria, though Saddam's half-brother, Watban, was caught before he could make the jump. Another half-brother, Barzan al-Takriti, was killed a few days ago in an American bombing. It was an altogether bad week for half-brothers.
From a Syrian perspective, it's unclear what advantages Bashar Asad will derive from the thugs showing up at his doorstep. Before we underestimate Syrian ingenuity, however, it is conceivable the renegades will be sold back to a new postwar Iraqi government for concessions, including economic concessions. The Syrian regime has never sympathized with its Iraqi counterparts. However, given the militant tone in Damascus these days, kicking the Iraqis back to Baghdad may be a red line Asad won't want to cross, though I wonder why.
Syria has denied it is receiving Iraqi runaways. However, in a statement, Syria's deputy ambassador to the United States, Imad Moustapha, said it was the responsibility of U.S. troops to monitor Iraq's western border with Syria. That seems to be a nice way of saying: "If you can catch them, fine, but if you can't, we'll let them enter Syria." One thing to watch out for, however, is the seniority of officials Syria will allow in. Saddam and his sons are almost surely no-no's. The lowly Muhammad Saeed al-Sahhaf, on the other hand, would be welcomed (perhaps to boost confidence in the Syrian economy). The only problem with that logic is that Watban was pretty high up.
Kidding aside, does Syria really want an Iraqi Baathist exile community in Damascus. Would you?
If you're ever in Monte Carlo betting on the numbers, make sure you don't have a Syrian or a Frenchman whispering advice to you, because if their wagering against the U.S. in Iraq was any indicator, you'll be lucky to go home wearing a fig leaf. There's something eerily similar in Syrian and French diplomacy towards the Iraq war: Both countries decided to lead the procession of protest against the U.S, other protestors were happy to let them lead, and all in favor of an Iraqi regime that was obviously on the way out.
The thought came to mind as U.S. defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld declared that several top Iraqi officials had escaped to Syria, though Saddam's half-brother, Watban, was caught before he could make the jump. Another half-brother, Barzan al-Takriti, was killed a few days ago in an American bombing. It was an altogether bad week for half-brothers.
From a Syrian perspective, it's unclear what advantages Bashar Asad will derive from the thugs showing up at his doorstep. Before we underestimate Syrian ingenuity, however, it is conceivable the renegades will be sold back to a new postwar Iraqi government for concessions, including economic concessions. The Syrian regime has never sympathized with its Iraqi counterparts. However, given the militant tone in Damascus these days, kicking the Iraqis back to Baghdad may be a red line Asad won't want to cross, though I wonder why.
Syria has denied it is receiving Iraqi runaways. However, in a statement, Syria's deputy ambassador to the United States, Imad Moustapha, said it was the responsibility of U.S. troops to monitor Iraq's western border with Syria. That seems to be a nice way of saying: "If you can catch them, fine, but if you can't, we'll let them enter Syria." One thing to watch out for, however, is the seniority of officials Syria will allow in. Saddam and his sons are almost surely no-no's. The lowly Muhammad Saeed al-Sahhaf, on the other hand, would be welcomed (perhaps to boost confidence in the Syrian economy). The only problem with that logic is that Watban was pretty high up.
Kidding aside, does Syria really want an Iraqi Baathist exile community in Damascus. Would you?
In praise of irrelevance
(Readers will forgive that the following entry covers three separate post boxes. Being a technical idiot, I had no idea how to fit such a long text into a single box. So just read till the words "fundamentally evil" appear--always a fine way to end).
Have just received a copy of Adam Shatz's article on Fouad Ajami for the April 28 issue of The Nation, titled "The Native Informant." A deeply envious article that ultimately boils down to one thing: Ajami serves a political order Shatz cannot stomach.
What does Shatz think of Ajami?
"What Ajami abhors in 'politicized men and women' is conviction itself. A leftist in the 1970s, a Shiite nationalist in the 1980s, an apologist for the Saudis in the 1990s, a critic-turned-lover of Israel, a skeptic-turned-enthusiast of American empire, he has observed no consistent principle in his career other than deference to power."
The accusation, which given the peculiar context Shatz is describing preaches the virtues of immobility, is smug, coming from someone who no doubt situates himself among the "politicized men and women" of conviction. It is also exotic in light of the fact that Shatz spends page after page criticizing Ajami precisely for his convictions. The path from Shiite leftist in the 1970s to Shiite nationalist in the 1980s (by the way, what is a Shiite nationalist?) was far more natural than Shatz suggests in that passage. Ironically, the explanation for that transformation is well documented in the rest of his piece.
(Readers will forgive that the following entry covers three separate post boxes. Being a technical idiot, I had no idea how to fit such a long text into a single box. So just read till the words "fundamentally evil" appear--always a fine way to end).
Have just received a copy of Adam Shatz's article on Fouad Ajami for the April 28 issue of The Nation, titled "The Native Informant." A deeply envious article that ultimately boils down to one thing: Ajami serves a political order Shatz cannot stomach.
What does Shatz think of Ajami?
"What Ajami abhors in 'politicized men and women' is conviction itself. A leftist in the 1970s, a Shiite nationalist in the 1980s, an apologist for the Saudis in the 1990s, a critic-turned-lover of Israel, a skeptic-turned-enthusiast of American empire, he has observed no consistent principle in his career other than deference to power."
The accusation, which given the peculiar context Shatz is describing preaches the virtues of immobility, is smug, coming from someone who no doubt situates himself among the "politicized men and women" of conviction. It is also exotic in light of the fact that Shatz spends page after page criticizing Ajami precisely for his convictions. The path from Shiite leftist in the 1970s to Shiite nationalist in the 1980s (by the way, what is a Shiite nationalist?) was far more natural than Shatz suggests in that passage. Ironically, the explanation for that transformation is well documented in the rest of his piece.
While I deeply disagree with Ajami on Israel and the Palestinians, he has shown a strange consistency on this matter since turning against the PLO two decades ago. The fact is he sees himself as an American and, therefore, not bound by the slogans imposed on Arab intellectuals. Saudi Arabia? Has Shatz forgotten that until September 11, being a Saudi apologist was a cottage industry in Washington? Or that the rampant anti-Saudi attitude in Washington was one adopted by Ajami's neo-con peers who are now in positions of power? Did Ajami, who is supposedly so bent on deferring to power, go along? Shatz admits the answer is no, criticizing Ajami, now, for remaining consistent on the Saudis. There is an explanation: the Saudis have paid him off. What is that French saying: "When you want to drown your dog, accuse him of having rabies."
We also learn that Ajami "has produced little scholarly work of value," (a phrase unwittingly explaining why Ajami is so relevant) whose book The Arab Predicament "did not offer a bold or original argument; like Isaiah Berlin's Russian Thinkers, it provided an interpretive survey--respectful even when critical--of other people's ideas." In a roundabout (and deniable) way that sounds suspiciously similar to what Christopher Hitchens wrote of Berlin, namely that "he never broke any original ground in the field of ideas. He was a skilled ventriloquist for other thinkers."
We also learn about Ajami: "His once-luminous writing, increasingly a blend of Naipaulean cliches about Muslim pathologies and Churchillian rhetoric about the burdens of empire, is saturated with hostility toward Sunni Arabs in general (save for pro-Western Gulf Arabs, toward whom he is notably indulgent), and to Palestinians in particular."
We also learn that Ajami "has produced little scholarly work of value," (a phrase unwittingly explaining why Ajami is so relevant) whose book The Arab Predicament "did not offer a bold or original argument; like Isaiah Berlin's Russian Thinkers, it provided an interpretive survey--respectful even when critical--of other people's ideas." In a roundabout (and deniable) way that sounds suspiciously similar to what Christopher Hitchens wrote of Berlin, namely that "he never broke any original ground in the field of ideas. He was a skilled ventriloquist for other thinkers."
We also learn about Ajami: "His once-luminous writing, increasingly a blend of Naipaulean cliches about Muslim pathologies and Churchillian rhetoric about the burdens of empire, is saturated with hostility toward Sunni Arabs in general (save for pro-Western Gulf Arabs, toward whom he is notably indulgent), and to Palestinians in particular."
I can reveal that Shatz used very different language when he contacted me for information on Ajami while preparing the piece, writing: "I have enormous respect for Ajami's work, particularly for The Arab Predicament and The Hidden Imam [sic]. He is, of course, a splendidly elegant stylist." I can also say that I told Shatz he had contacted the wrong person for what he said would be "a critical profile of Fouad Ajami."
Shatz does reproduce a genuinely interesting comment by Hisham Melhem, Washington correspondent of Al-Safir: "Edward [Said] and Fouad are both crazy about Conrad, but they see in him very different things. Edward sees the critic of empire, especially in Heart of Darkness. Fouad, on the other hand, admires the Polish exile in Western Europe who made a conscious break with the old country." Yet Shatz never takes that judgment to its logical conclusion.
What does one get out of this mishmash? Perhaps a realization that people on the left treasure stalemate over change, and powerlessness over all else. Yet what irks Ajami's enemies most is his estrangement from his cultural roots combined with his simultaneous fascination for the Arab world. Somehow, in giving up on his critics’ version of the Middle East, Ajami was supposed to roll over and play dead. The fact that he didn't, and actually has a say in Washington, has meant "[l]ike the empire he serves, Ajami is more influential, and more isolated, than he has ever been."
Alas, I fear it is Shatz and his comrades who are the isolated ones, which is not necessarily for the better in a Washington that today leans in only one direction. But Ajami is not the culprit. The left is, for so foolishly considering that having influence in "the empire" is something fundamentally evil.
Shatz does reproduce a genuinely interesting comment by Hisham Melhem, Washington correspondent of Al-Safir: "Edward [Said] and Fouad are both crazy about Conrad, but they see in him very different things. Edward sees the critic of empire, especially in Heart of Darkness. Fouad, on the other hand, admires the Polish exile in Western Europe who made a conscious break with the old country." Yet Shatz never takes that judgment to its logical conclusion.
What does one get out of this mishmash? Perhaps a realization that people on the left treasure stalemate over change, and powerlessness over all else. Yet what irks Ajami's enemies most is his estrangement from his cultural roots combined with his simultaneous fascination for the Arab world. Somehow, in giving up on his critics’ version of the Middle East, Ajami was supposed to roll over and play dead. The fact that he didn't, and actually has a say in Washington, has meant "[l]ike the empire he serves, Ajami is more influential, and more isolated, than he has ever been."
Alas, I fear it is Shatz and his comrades who are the isolated ones, which is not necessarily for the better in a Washington that today leans in only one direction. But Ajami is not the culprit. The left is, for so foolishly considering that having influence in "the empire" is something fundamentally evil.
Saturday, April 12, 2003
The London Daily Telegraph has published this obituary of Ayatollah Abdel Majid a-Kho'i. Though unsigned, it is reportedly the work of Adel Darwish.
I had failed to read this article from the Washington Post yesterday when I wondered about American prisoners of war caught in Iraq.
Dr. Germ and Mrs. Anthrax
According to the Washington Times, Iraqi weapons scientists have fled to Syria, including Huda Salih Mahdi Ammash, known as "Mrs. Anthrax" and Rihab Taha, known as "Dr. Germ." According to Andrew and Patrick Cocburn in their book Out of the Ashes, in 1993 the former arms inspector Rolf Ekeus brought Taha together with her future husband, Amer Rashid, in New York:
Love bloomed on the East River, Rashid left his wife, and he and Dr. Taha were married shortly afterward. "I was the matchmaker for this dreadful pair." says Ekeus ruefully."
Ammash is one of 55 Iraqis on a list the U.S. publicized yesterday of individuals wanted for possible war crimes. So is Rashid, who was Iraq's oil minister. Taha is merely wanted for questioning. If the information is true, there are hard days ahead for Syria, which must surely have wondered up to what level of Iraqi officials it could welcome.
On another note, the same Times story suggests some Iraqi weapons scientists were seeking refuge in France, though the administration official cited asked to remain anonymous, suggesting that might not be confirmed.
Well-oiled
This from the Seattle Post-Intelligencer:
U.S. troops regarded the looting [in Baghdad] as a release from years of pent-up anger and frustration.
From their Humvees, tanks and armored personnel carriers, the soldiers watched the events of the day -- lootings and homecoming weekend-style bonfires -- with smiles on their faces.
At least one exception to the leniency by U.S. soldiers was the Oil Ministry. American troops in desert camouflage, their M-16s pointed to the street, peered from the overhang above the ministry's entrance.
This from the Seattle Post-Intelligencer:
U.S. troops regarded the looting [in Baghdad] as a release from years of pent-up anger and frustration.
From their Humvees, tanks and armored personnel carriers, the soldiers watched the events of the day -- lootings and homecoming weekend-style bonfires -- with smiles on their faces.
At least one exception to the leniency by U.S. soldiers was the Oil Ministry. American troops in desert camouflage, their M-16s pointed to the street, peered from the overhang above the ministry's entrance.
Qusay alive?
My friend Khaled Oweis filed this report for Reuters, suggesting Saddam's son, Qusay, was seen alive by residents on Monday after the bombing of a restaurant in the Mansur district of Baghdad.
My friend Khaled Oweis filed this report for Reuters, suggesting Saddam's son, Qusay, was seen alive by residents on Monday after the bombing of a restaurant in the Mansur district of Baghdad.
Here is my latest from the Lebanon section of the Daily Star. It argues that Syria must do several things if it wants to come of out the coming months unscathed by the U.S.:
(1) Avoid destabilizing Lebanon by turning it into a relay station for messages directed at Washington; (2) once the Iraq war ends, begin discussing with the Lebanese a new relationship that both sides find acceptable (by which I mainly mean the Syrian government and a majority of the Lebanese people) and that puts an end to Syria's unhealthy militarily-backed domination over the Lebanon; and (3) open up Syrian society politically and economically, as Syrian president Bashar Asad sort of promised two years ago.
Any chance of this happening? I'm afraid regimes that side with Saddam on the eve of his demise are not always the best judges of what is in their interests.
(1) Avoid destabilizing Lebanon by turning it into a relay station for messages directed at Washington; (2) once the Iraq war ends, begin discussing with the Lebanese a new relationship that both sides find acceptable (by which I mainly mean the Syrian government and a majority of the Lebanese people) and that puts an end to Syria's unhealthy militarily-backed domination over the Lebanon; and (3) open up Syrian society politically and economically, as Syrian president Bashar Asad sort of promised two years ago.
Any chance of this happening? I'm afraid regimes that side with Saddam on the eve of his demise are not always the best judges of what is in their interests.
Cover fire from Sahhaf
We now are in a better position to know what Muhammad Saeed al-Sahhaf's act was. No, not to show that the Iraqi regime had a sense of humor (we knew that anyway), but to cover for the fact that Saddam and virtually everybody else in his entourage had decided probably long before to clear out of Baghdad. Sahhaf was indeed, as the former head of military intelligence, Wafiq al-Samarra'i, told Orbit's Imad al-Din Adeeb (thanks to Joe Bahout for this tidbit), the last remnant of the Iraq regime in the Iraqi captal.
Sahhaf may have behaved like a clown, but he did the job. As if anyone could survive that system by just being funny.
Friday, April 11, 2003
Where are the PoWs?
One of the stories lost in the general chaos that has become Iraq is: What happened to the U.S. prisoners of war who were caught by the Iraqis in Nasiriyya, and the helicopter pilots who were later captured? There were unconfirmed reports that some of the Nasiriyya PoWs were executed, but nothing since. Could they be bargaining chips Saddam hopes to use?
One of the stories lost in the general chaos that has become Iraq is: What happened to the U.S. prisoners of war who were caught by the Iraqis in Nasiriyya, and the helicopter pilots who were later captured? There were unconfirmed reports that some of the Nasiriyya PoWs were executed, but nothing since. Could they be bargaining chips Saddam hopes to use?
Some links. The New York Times is reporting that heavy fighting is going on around the Iraqi town of Qaim, on the Syrian border, "where American Green Berets and British commandos have been attacking units of Iraq's Special Republican Guard and Special Security Services, according to senior military and defense officials." There is some suspicion the site contains banned weapons, given that the Iraqis are fighting almost as hard as Saddam's statue did in Al-Firdaws square.
The article noted that another possible reason for the heavy fighting is that the Iraqi troops are shielding officials trying to flee to Syria. However, it did add: "Today, defense officials said there was no evidence that those believed to have fled [to Syria] included any senior Iraqi leaders."
Meanwhile, the Washington Post yesterday ran a profile of Jay Garner, the man who will head the civil administration in Iraq, and who still refuses to talk to anybody. The article is useful inasmuch as it tries to tell us more than the fact that he is a "Zionist", as many papers in the region have called him. While I agree that his reputation as a supporter of Israel will not help him in Iraq, and could indeed impede his effectiveness, I do think that his efforts during Operation Provide Comfort in Kurdistan merit much closer review in order to judge his capabilities.
Somehow I've been pegged as a "Garner expert", whether by Business Week or (egad!) Austrian radio, though I've always insisted I know very little about him. That comes from sleepily writing an introductory piece on Garner (and one of his possible future deputies) for Beirut's Daily Star, which Reason magazine charitably reprinted.
The Post story even has a link to a new anti-Garner website.
The article noted that another possible reason for the heavy fighting is that the Iraqi troops are shielding officials trying to flee to Syria. However, it did add: "Today, defense officials said there was no evidence that those believed to have fled [to Syria] included any senior Iraqi leaders."
Meanwhile, the Washington Post yesterday ran a profile of Jay Garner, the man who will head the civil administration in Iraq, and who still refuses to talk to anybody. The article is useful inasmuch as it tries to tell us more than the fact that he is a "Zionist", as many papers in the region have called him. While I agree that his reputation as a supporter of Israel will not help him in Iraq, and could indeed impede his effectiveness, I do think that his efforts during Operation Provide Comfort in Kurdistan merit much closer review in order to judge his capabilities.
Somehow I've been pegged as a "Garner expert", whether by Business Week or (egad!) Austrian radio, though I've always insisted I know very little about him. That comes from sleepily writing an introductory piece on Garner (and one of his possible future deputies) for Beirut's Daily Star, which Reason magazine charitably reprinted.
The Post story even has a link to a new anti-Garner website.
Bush man's burden
All credit to William Saletan for commenting on Bush's condescending speech to the Iraqis, which few in Iraq could actually see.
Saletan wrote:
If you're black, Hispanic, or a member of some other group often stereotyped as incompetent, you may be familiar with this kind of condescension. It's the way polite white people express their surprise that you aren't stupid. They marvel at how "bright" and "articulate" you are. Instead of treating you the way they'd treat an equally competent white person—say, by ignoring you—they fuss over your every accomplishment.
Then, he added, ironically
No wonder Bush gave the Iraqis a pep talk. They're underprivileged, at-risk, and challenged. They lack self-esteem. They need to be told that they're capable, despite what others may say. Even Tony Blair is patting them on the back. "You are an inventive, creative people," he told them in a televised message accompanying Bush's remarks. I wonder what the Arabic phrase is for "hand me the remote."
I can answer that: A'teeni al-remote, l'an sakkitun, ya rab!
All credit to William Saletan for commenting on Bush's condescending speech to the Iraqis, which few in Iraq could actually see.
Saletan wrote:
If you're black, Hispanic, or a member of some other group often stereotyped as incompetent, you may be familiar with this kind of condescension. It's the way polite white people express their surprise that you aren't stupid. They marvel at how "bright" and "articulate" you are. Instead of treating you the way they'd treat an equally competent white person—say, by ignoring you—they fuss over your every accomplishment.
Then, he added, ironically
No wonder Bush gave the Iraqis a pep talk. They're underprivileged, at-risk, and challenged. They lack self-esteem. They need to be told that they're capable, despite what others may say. Even Tony Blair is patting them on the back. "You are an inventive, creative people," he told them in a televised message accompanying Bush's remarks. I wonder what the Arabic phrase is for "hand me the remote."
I can answer that: A'teeni al-remote, l'an sakkitun, ya rab!
Chop chop
As predicted yesterday, the supposed deah of Nizar Khazraji in Najaf, alongside Abdel Majid al-Kho'i, appears to be (1) pure fabrication or (2) misinformation by Arab News, a branch of the Al-Sharq al-Awsat newspaper. No reports on al-Kho'is's death have even mentioned Khazraji.
However, Arab News did publish an article today praising its correspondent Essam al-Ghalib for the following:
Yesterday, he broke as a world exclusive on www.arabnews.com the news that Shiite scholar Abdul Majid Al-Khoei had been killed in Najaf's Ali Mosque, after taking eye witness accounts from Iraqis who had just witnessed the scene.
In contrast to American briefings, which put the incident down to "Shiite sectarianism," Essam told the truth: That Al-Khoei had been butchered — literally cut to pieces with knives and swords -- by Iraqis who accused him of being "an American stooge."
Yes, but he or someone else on Arab News also broke as a World Exclusive (though the world paid no attention) that Khazraji too had been bumped off, so we'll wait a few days before applauding Essam, whose photo appears here, apparently after he was "was ambushed in his jeep by bandits, shot at from close range, and then robbed of almost all his belongings."
Thursday, April 10, 2003
Khazraji RIP?
Thanks to Kendall Harmon for pointing me to this Arab News story:
WORLD EXCLUSIVE: from Arab News War Correspondent in Najaf, Iraq; filed 2 pm GMT; April 10: Former Iraqi general Nizar Al-Khazaraji and Islamic scholar Majid Al-Khoi'i have both been executed by Iraqi residents of Najaf, according to five independent Iraqi witnesses to the incident who spoke to Arab News, the only foreign publication with a correspondent in the city today. The two potential Iraqi leaders of the city, who were supported by the US, 'were afterwards chopped into pieces with swords and knives inside the Ali Mosque this morning by Iraqis who accused them of being American stooges," one of the witnesses said. Another said that a US Special Force Soldier, who had been acting as their body guard, was also killed in the incident.
Arab News is a branch of the Al-Sharq al-Awsat operation, and it is maybe significant that Maan Fayyad, a journalist at the paper, was a witness to the al-Kho'i assassination (he was also injured in the attack). For that story click here.
Arab News also has an earlier story claiming that there were three factions vying for influence in Najaf: one controlled by Kho'i, a second by Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, and a third by Khazraji.
Two things are worth noting: only Arab News has mentioned Khazraji in the melee; and it is not clear what Khazraji, a Sunni, would have been doing in the shrine of the Imam Ali at a gathering of Shiite mullahs--one of whom was a former Saddam man, whose presence allegedly triggered the violence. The story sounds bizarre to me.
Thanks to Kendall Harmon for pointing me to this Arab News story:
WORLD EXCLUSIVE: from Arab News War Correspondent in Najaf, Iraq; filed 2 pm GMT; April 10: Former Iraqi general Nizar Al-Khazaraji and Islamic scholar Majid Al-Khoi'i have both been executed by Iraqi residents of Najaf, according to five independent Iraqi witnesses to the incident who spoke to Arab News, the only foreign publication with a correspondent in the city today. The two potential Iraqi leaders of the city, who were supported by the US, 'were afterwards chopped into pieces with swords and knives inside the Ali Mosque this morning by Iraqis who accused them of being American stooges," one of the witnesses said. Another said that a US Special Force Soldier, who had been acting as their body guard, was also killed in the incident.
Arab News is a branch of the Al-Sharq al-Awsat operation, and it is maybe significant that Maan Fayyad, a journalist at the paper, was a witness to the al-Kho'i assassination (he was also injured in the attack). For that story click here.
Arab News also has an earlier story claiming that there were three factions vying for influence in Najaf: one controlled by Kho'i, a second by Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, and a third by Khazraji.
Two things are worth noting: only Arab News has mentioned Khazraji in the melee; and it is not clear what Khazraji, a Sunni, would have been doing in the shrine of the Imam Ali at a gathering of Shiite mullahs--one of whom was a former Saddam man, whose presence allegedly triggered the violence. The story sounds bizarre to me.
Abdel Majid al-Kho'i, son of the late Grand Ayatollah al-Kho'i has reportedly been assassinated in Najaf CNN is reporting. Though he was not considered nearly as influential as his father, he headed the wealthy Kho'i Foundation. This must probably be seen as part of the postwar struggle for power for predominance in the Shiite community. More on this later.
Press notes
Jack Shafer has an interesting article in Slate on the bombing of the Palestine hotel Wednesday. His point, and he makes what I think is a good case, is that the journalists were not deliberately targeted. Indeed, an LBCI correspondent in Baghdad, Sultan Suleiman, tried to trip up a U.S. officer yesterday outside the hotel by asking him whether he knew that what the building was. The officer, who was clearly not trying to be cunning, replied that he did not what any of the buildings around were. If there was a mistake, I think, it was in not telling soldiers where the journalists were located.
Wednesday, I watched the Abu Dhabi channel footage of the tank firing right at the camera. The station's crew deserved credit for catching what were genuinely stunning shots. The correspondent will be able to dine out on that one for awhile. However, shortly before the tanks fired at the building, he said he was clearing out (they left the camera behind), suggesting he knew the danger--something that became obvious when the tank commander started looking straight at the camera.
On another note, Al-Jazeera's Maher Abdullah was interviewed by CNN last night. He had no problems admitting that the Iraqi celebrations were genuine, and his comments on the situation were otherwise quite judicious. He did, however, make it a point to state that he was not a defender of U.S. policy in the region. He need not be, but it was funny that he should have felt a need to say that (to preface another comment).
Jack Shafer has an interesting article in Slate on the bombing of the Palestine hotel Wednesday. His point, and he makes what I think is a good case, is that the journalists were not deliberately targeted. Indeed, an LBCI correspondent in Baghdad, Sultan Suleiman, tried to trip up a U.S. officer yesterday outside the hotel by asking him whether he knew that what the building was. The officer, who was clearly not trying to be cunning, replied that he did not what any of the buildings around were. If there was a mistake, I think, it was in not telling soldiers where the journalists were located.
Wednesday, I watched the Abu Dhabi channel footage of the tank firing right at the camera. The station's crew deserved credit for catching what were genuinely stunning shots. The correspondent will be able to dine out on that one for awhile. However, shortly before the tanks fired at the building, he said he was clearing out (they left the camera behind), suggesting he knew the danger--something that became obvious when the tank commander started looking straight at the camera.
On another note, Al-Jazeera's Maher Abdullah was interviewed by CNN last night. He had no problems admitting that the Iraqi celebrations were genuine, and his comments on the situation were otherwise quite judicious. He did, however, make it a point to state that he was not a defender of U.S. policy in the region. He need not be, but it was funny that he should have felt a need to say that (to preface another comment).
Self promo time. Yesterday, I wrote an article for Slate on the Khazraji affair. Coincidentally, the Wall Street Journal published a front-page story on the disappearance.
It was about time, wouldn't you agree?
It was about time, wouldn't you agree?
Wednesday, April 09, 2003
Headless
So Saddam's statue finally fell, showing far more spirit than his regime did. Meanwhile, Syria satellite was showing a documentary with nice photographs of John the Baptist's tomb in the Umayyad mosque.
They definitely missed the irony of that.
For a bit more on how the Arab world has embraced passivity by interpreting the Iraq war as a giant conspiracy, you might want to see my column today in the Daily Star.
Masks off
Sterling performances by most Arab media to the footage of Iraqis finally rid of Saddam. Syrian satellite is still ignoring the story, so is Hizbullah's Al-Manar station (though the scenes of celebrating Shiites was right down its alley). Al-Jazeera is showing some street scenes, but is mixing this with shots of men removing the body of its correspondent who was killed yesterday in a U.S. attack. Orbit's excellent Egyptian journalist Imad al-Din Adeeb sat aghast as he interviewed two former generals who showed that the fog of battle had terminally enveloped them--both, St. Thomas-like, insisted they were "only seeing one side of the story."
The masks are off. This may have been a revolutionary war for many Arab stations, but it was a typically Arab type of revolution, one blending an aspiration for technical prowess with dismal ideological rigidity and backwardness.
A word of warning on the freedom demonstrations, though: one of the first things the Shiite throngs did was to pray and hold up a portrait of who I believe was the martyred Hussein. The clock is already ticking on the U.S. presence. Those Iraqis want freedom, but what they want most is to rule over themselves--not have the U.S. and Jay Garner do it for them. And the religious edge to the whole thing is already alarmingly palpable.
I don't think the Bush administration knows what Pandora's Box it has opened in trying to figure out how that complex religious and tribal structure in Iraq can be managed to everyone's satisfaction. Here's a scenario: What if Saddam is indeed in Tikrit and uses Sunni fears of the Shiites to feed a new religious-tribal conflict?
Sterling performances by most Arab media to the footage of Iraqis finally rid of Saddam. Syrian satellite is still ignoring the story, so is Hizbullah's Al-Manar station (though the scenes of celebrating Shiites was right down its alley). Al-Jazeera is showing some street scenes, but is mixing this with shots of men removing the body of its correspondent who was killed yesterday in a U.S. attack. Orbit's excellent Egyptian journalist Imad al-Din Adeeb sat aghast as he interviewed two former generals who showed that the fog of battle had terminally enveloped them--both, St. Thomas-like, insisted they were "only seeing one side of the story."
The masks are off. This may have been a revolutionary war for many Arab stations, but it was a typically Arab type of revolution, one blending an aspiration for technical prowess with dismal ideological rigidity and backwardness.
A word of warning on the freedom demonstrations, though: one of the first things the Shiite throngs did was to pray and hold up a portrait of who I believe was the martyred Hussein. The clock is already ticking on the U.S. presence. Those Iraqis want freedom, but what they want most is to rule over themselves--not have the U.S. and Jay Garner do it for them. And the religious edge to the whole thing is already alarmingly palpable.
I don't think the Bush administration knows what Pandora's Box it has opened in trying to figure out how that complex religious and tribal structure in Iraq can be managed to everyone's satisfaction. Here's a scenario: What if Saddam is indeed in Tikrit and uses Sunni fears of the Shiites to feed a new religious-tribal conflict?
Tuesday, April 08, 2003
Peretzelhead
Thanks to Tim Cavanaugh, I was able to pick this up off the New York Times website. It's a clarification letter from Martin Peretz, the owner of the New Republic, on the late Michael Kelly, who recently died in Iraq and whom Peretz fired a few years ago as TNR editor:
To the Editor:
Re: "Michael Kelly, 46, Editor and Columnist, Dies in Iraq" (obituary, April 5):
I do not mean at all to mar the coverage of the tragic death of Michael Kelly in Iraq by quibbling. But I did not fire Mr. Kelly as editor of The New Republic in 1997 because of how he configured "the magazine's coverage of Vice President Al Gore."
Mr. Kelly wrote incandescent prose. As an editor, however, Mr. Kelly's single-minded focus on President Bill Clinton's improprieties distorted his perspective on the policies of the Clinton-Gore administration and brought him into conflict not only with me but also with much of the intellectual history of the magazine.
Mr. Kelly's true career began in 1991 in the sands of Iraq. He knew the nobility of purpose that brought American troops and himself back to the region 12 years later.
MARTIN PERETZ
Editor in Chief, The New Republic
Washington, April 5, 2003
So if we are to understand Marty right, the intellectual history of TNR is such that it precludes focusing on the improprieties of a president.
Thanks to Tim Cavanaugh, I was able to pick this up off the New York Times website. It's a clarification letter from Martin Peretz, the owner of the New Republic, on the late Michael Kelly, who recently died in Iraq and whom Peretz fired a few years ago as TNR editor:
To the Editor:
Re: "Michael Kelly, 46, Editor and Columnist, Dies in Iraq" (obituary, April 5):
I do not mean at all to mar the coverage of the tragic death of Michael Kelly in Iraq by quibbling. But I did not fire Mr. Kelly as editor of The New Republic in 1997 because of how he configured "the magazine's coverage of Vice President Al Gore."
Mr. Kelly wrote incandescent prose. As an editor, however, Mr. Kelly's single-minded focus on President Bill Clinton's improprieties distorted his perspective on the policies of the Clinton-Gore administration and brought him into conflict not only with me but also with much of the intellectual history of the magazine.
Mr. Kelly's true career began in 1991 in the sands of Iraq. He knew the nobility of purpose that brought American troops and himself back to the region 12 years later.
MARTIN PERETZ
Editor in Chief, The New Republic
Washington, April 5, 2003
So if we are to understand Marty right, the intellectual history of TNR is such that it precludes focusing on the improprieties of a president.
More journalists killed or injured
The Reuters bureau chief in Beirut, Samia Nakhoul, was injured in Baghdad when a U.S. tank fired on the Palestine hotel where much of the foreign press is located. A Ukrainian cameraman was, alas, killed and another Reuters correspondent was injured. Al-Jazeera also lost a correspondent today.
War may be hell, but I can't help but wonder why a campaign so geared to capturing hearts and minds cannot give tank crews a clearer sense of where the press, at least, is. By the way, CENTCOM's claim that a sniper fired at the tank from the roof of the hotel was patently false: seconds before the shell hit, a Jazeera correspondent was filing a live report right under the building, and there clearly were no outgoing shots at the time.
What's his name, again
According to the AP (through this BBC link) Osama bin Laden has released a new recording, this one promising more suicide attacks.
Reportedly OBL said: "The United States has attacked Iraq and soon...will also attack Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Sudan."
Are you sure that wasn't James Woolsey on the tape?
According to the AP (through this BBC link) Osama bin Laden has released a new recording, this one promising more suicide attacks.
Reportedly OBL said: "The United States has attacked Iraq and soon...will also attack Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Sudan."
Are you sure that wasn't James Woolsey on the tape?
Monday, April 07, 2003
Just a thought: does discovering the body of "Chemical Ali" (if it was indeed he) count as a discovery of a chemical weapon?
At this point of the game, any little bit will help to prove that Saddam actually had such weapons. Still, thanks to Nick Gillespie for this link to a Reuters story which suggests a discovery might bring relief from the chemical drought.
At this point of the game, any little bit will help to prove that Saddam actually had such weapons. Still, thanks to Nick Gillespie for this link to a Reuters story which suggests a discovery might bring relief from the chemical drought.
Woolsey over your eyes
I'm wondering, why is it that all the right-wingers are using the word "fascist" to describe this thuggish regime or that? This thought comes to mind reading David Corn's profile of James Woolsey in the Nation. Corn writes, of a Woolsey speech at UCLA:
He cited three enemies: the religious leaders of Iran, the 'fascists' of Syria and Iraq, and Islamic extremists like Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda.
Why fascists? I see no problem in using the word, but that's hardly an accurate term to describe what is in Syria really a rather weak and fretful semi-authoritarian hereditary republic. I rarely agree with the Nation (and I'm really not too fond of Corn's piece), but I've always found Woolsey to be an opportunist--as his incorrect use of an otherwise emotionally useful term proves--as well as a liar, particularly in his vain efforts to prove that a link existed between Saddam and Al-Qaida. He never offered a shred of evidence, which led me to wonder what this man was doing recycling intelligence at the CIA.
Then I learned that his passage there was regarded as catastrophic.
Bye cuz
Is "Chemical Ali" History? British forces are saying they discovered the body of Ali Hassan al-Majid, Saddam's cousin and arguably the most ruthless person in the Iraqi regime. I still recall watching captured Iraqi videotape of him directing operations in the south in 1991 when Iraqi forces crushed the Shiite uprising. The film showed prisoners being dragged off to be shot, while one weeping prisoner was caught on film praying. This so irritated one Iraqi officer that he cocked his gun, but strangely he did not shoot the man on the spot.
Disappointment reigns: Al-Majid deserved a far worse death.
Is "Chemical Ali" History? British forces are saying they discovered the body of Ali Hassan al-Majid, Saddam's cousin and arguably the most ruthless person in the Iraqi regime. I still recall watching captured Iraqi videotape of him directing operations in the south in 1991 when Iraqi forces crushed the Shiite uprising. The film showed prisoners being dragged off to be shot, while one weeping prisoner was caught on film praying. This so irritated one Iraqi officer that he cocked his gun, but strangely he did not shoot the man on the spot.
Disappointment reigns: Al-Majid deserved a far worse death.
One of Paul Wolfowitz's admirers is Christopher Hitchens. That's one thing we learn in a Washington Post portrait of "probably the best-known deputy secretary of defense in recent memory" (to quote a White House aide), published today.
Another Wolfie watcher, Hisham Melhem of Beirut's Al-Safir, a paper which has absolutely no sympathy for the administration's war in Iraq, is quoted as saying:
It takes my breath away when I think about the scale of the transformation that [Wolfowitz and others] are trying to achieve in the Middle East. It is so radical, so optimistic, so audacious. It is a new American imperium. . . . They are going to create an earthquake in Iraq that will reverberate throughout the region.
Hisham probably meant it negatively, but somehow that didn't quite come through. It does remind me, though, of what the Syrian intellectual, Sadeq al-Azm, told me, namely that a democratic Iraq could have an impact on the Middle East similar to that of Perestroika on the USSR.
Sunday, April 06, 2003
Khazraji found?
The Australian Broadcasting Corp. is saying on its website that Denmark's Politiken daily has reported that Gen. Nizar Khazraji is in Kuwait, after being spirited out of Denmark thanks to CIA help.
Here are the first three paragraphs of the ABC News story:
Former Iraqi General Nizar al-Khazraji, touted as a possible successor to President Saddam Hussein, is now in Kuwait after escaping from Denmark last month with the help of the CIA, the Danish daily Politiken reported on Sunday.
Citing a report by the former head of the CIA's counter-terrorism department, a copy of which was obtained by the paper, Politiken said the US security services see Khazraji as their preferred successor for Saddam in a post-war Iraq, a view that is not shared by the Pentagon.
The ex-CIA official, who completed the confidential report on March 28, said the US intelligence services secretly extracted Khazraji and that he was currently helping US forces in the war against Baghdad, according to Politiken.
The Australian Broadcasting Corp. is saying on its website that Denmark's Politiken daily has reported that Gen. Nizar Khazraji is in Kuwait, after being spirited out of Denmark thanks to CIA help.
Here are the first three paragraphs of the ABC News story:
Former Iraqi General Nizar al-Khazraji, touted as a possible successor to President Saddam Hussein, is now in Kuwait after escaping from Denmark last month with the help of the CIA, the Danish daily Politiken reported on Sunday.
Citing a report by the former head of the CIA's counter-terrorism department, a copy of which was obtained by the paper, Politiken said the US security services see Khazraji as their preferred successor for Saddam in a post-war Iraq, a view that is not shared by the Pentagon.
The ex-CIA official, who completed the confidential report on March 28, said the US intelligence services secretly extracted Khazraji and that he was currently helping US forces in the war against Baghdad, according to Politiken.
What comes after? Saddam is still around, but already the question is on the minds of observers, amid news that retired American Gen. Jay Garner is planning to move from Kuwait to Iraq soon and install his civil administration. The Washington Post has a detailed article on the politics involved in control over postwar Iraq--in the U.S. between the Pentagon and the State Department and between Congress and the Administration, but also, internationally, between the U.S. and everybody else on whether the U.N. should be given a postwar role--something the Bush administration is very ambiguous about.
Jane Perlez in the New York Times has another postwar politics piece, where she revealingly writes of Garner's team:
European and American leaders may still be arguing over whether the United Nations plays a role in postwar Iraq, and, if it does, how large that part should be. But those disputes are considered largely irrelevant by the team here, whose members argue that they are better off unfettered by the United Nations.
So the cliché may be right after all: it would be a relatively easy war (we keep our fingers crossed), but the U.S. might well screw up the postwar, since the Iraqis, whatever American spokesmen say, will very probably not regard a U.S. civil administration (under tight Pentagon control) as the first step towards democracy.
For more on this story, you can also refer to this article in London's The Observer. The Pentagon's open hostility to the U.N. is described:
The decision to proceed with an embryonic government comes in response to memoranda written by Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld last week, urging that the US begin to entrench its authority in areas under its control before the war is over.
Pentagon officials told The Observer that the administration is determined to impose the Rumsfeld plan and sees no use for a UN role, describing the international body as 'irrelevant'.
Jane Perlez in the New York Times has another postwar politics piece, where she revealingly writes of Garner's team:
European and American leaders may still be arguing over whether the United Nations plays a role in postwar Iraq, and, if it does, how large that part should be. But those disputes are considered largely irrelevant by the team here, whose members argue that they are better off unfettered by the United Nations.
So the cliché may be right after all: it would be a relatively easy war (we keep our fingers crossed), but the U.S. might well screw up the postwar, since the Iraqis, whatever American spokesmen say, will very probably not regard a U.S. civil administration (under tight Pentagon control) as the first step towards democracy.
For more on this story, you can also refer to this article in London's The Observer. The Pentagon's open hostility to the U.N. is described:
The decision to proceed with an embryonic government comes in response to memoranda written by Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld last week, urging that the US begin to entrench its authority in areas under its control before the war is over.
Pentagon officials told The Observer that the administration is determined to impose the Rumsfeld plan and sees no use for a UN role, describing the international body as 'irrelevant'.
Beirut reeling
A serious occurrence in Beirut yesterday. A half-stick of dynamite was placed in the bathroom of a McDonald's franchise in the Dora district in Beirut's eastern suburbs, injuring four. The police also discovered a car-bomb with 55kg of explosives in the parking lot. Reportedly, the bomb failed to explode. It was indeed strange to see two types of explosives planned: Why put a half-stick of dynamite in a place when you plan to blow it up with a devastating car-bomb?
This leads me to speculate that the car-bomb was really a political message directed at the U.S., through a well-known American brand name (albeit owned entirely by Lebanese). The car-bomb was not meant to blow, but the seriousness of the threat was emphasized by the dynamite. Who did it? One can only speculate, but I believe this was related to rising tensions in the Syrian-American relationship and Syria's fears that the U.S. plans to turn against it in the future.
This was the third bombing in three weeks (a bomb in Sidon against the apartment of a Dutch lady, another against the (closed) British Council building, and now this). The authorities have continued to play these events down (yesterday the state-owned Tele-Liban did not even lead with the item on its 7:30pm newscast), but the silence is becoming increasingly absurd.
PS--Since the above post I've spoken to someone who told me the car-bomb was indeed set to blow, but that a techncial glitch prevented it. I also spoke to someone well informed who, citing a Lebanese security source, confirmed my theory that it was not supposed to blow. Take your pick.
Saturday, April 05, 2003
Arnett's new job
Peter Arnett has a new job: he's now Al-Arabiya's correspondent in Baghdad. Maybe I just have a soft spot for Arnett, but to see him speak in English and be simultaneously dubbed over in Arabic was, well, a trifle disturbing, since his own voice used to be fairly well regarded in its own right.
Peter Arnett has a new job: he's now Al-Arabiya's correspondent in Baghdad. Maybe I just have a soft spot for Arnett, but to see him speak in English and be simultaneously dubbed over in Arabic was, well, a trifle disturbing, since his own voice used to be fairly well regarded in its own right.
Martin Kramer has an interesting posting on the continued debate over whether Ayatollah Sistani issued a fatwa calling on the inhabitants of Najaf to not interfere with U.S. forces.
He notes: "His office in Iran announced to news outlets that it could not confirm American claims of a fatwa, which Al-Jazeera promptly turned into a denial. It doesn't matter now: Ayatollah Sistani achieved precisely the effect he desired, which was to spare Najaf a vicious battle.)"
He also offers a number of additional insights on Sistani and on his politics towards the other Ulama in the region.
He notes: "His office in Iran announced to news outlets that it could not confirm American claims of a fatwa, which Al-Jazeera promptly turned into a denial. It doesn't matter now: Ayatollah Sistani achieved precisely the effect he desired, which was to spare Najaf a vicious battle.)"
He also offers a number of additional insights on Sistani and on his politics towards the other Ulama in the region.
Khazraji update update
Here is a Reuters report on the Danish government's request that the U.S. provide information on the circumstances of Gen. Nizar Khazraji's disappearance. The report noted:
In a letter to U.S. Ambassador Stuart Bernstein, Justice Minister Lene Espersen cited several Danish newspaper articles suggesting that the Central Intelligence Agency may have been involved.
"Against this background...I kindly ask you to provide me with any information from relevant American authorities on the circumstances under which Khazraji disappeared and his whereabouts since March 17, 2003," she wrote.
The letter also noted:
"It has also been proposed, however, that he escaped with the assistance of authorities of foreign countries or that he was even abducted by such authorities," Espersen wrote.
"In this connection, the Central Intelligence Agency has been mentioned in several articles," she said.
One should bear in mind the request was not an accusation--indeed it was formulated as an effort to avoid false accusations:
"Needless to say, such clarifications may also be important in order to avoid unnecessary -- and potentially harmful -- public myths and thus to preserve the excellent relations between Denmark and close friends and allies such as the United States."
Here is a Reuters report on the Danish government's request that the U.S. provide information on the circumstances of Gen. Nizar Khazraji's disappearance. The report noted:
In a letter to U.S. Ambassador Stuart Bernstein, Justice Minister Lene Espersen cited several Danish newspaper articles suggesting that the Central Intelligence Agency may have been involved.
"Against this background...I kindly ask you to provide me with any information from relevant American authorities on the circumstances under which Khazraji disappeared and his whereabouts since March 17, 2003," she wrote.
The letter also noted:
"It has also been proposed, however, that he escaped with the assistance of authorities of foreign countries or that he was even abducted by such authorities," Espersen wrote.
"In this connection, the Central Intelligence Agency has been mentioned in several articles," she said.
One should bear in mind the request was not an accusation--indeed it was formulated as an effort to avoid false accusations:
"Needless to say, such clarifications may also be important in order to avoid unnecessary -- and potentially harmful -- public myths and thus to preserve the excellent relations between Denmark and close friends and allies such as the United States."
Friday, April 04, 2003
From the "Democracy, Whiskey, Sexy" files:
Saddam Hussein and his chauffeur were rolling down the highway when suddenly they hit a pig crossing the road. They killed it instantly.
Saddam tells his driver: "Go to da farm over dere and hexplain to da honer of da pig what appened. "One hour later, Saddam sees his driver coming back from the farm, his clothes all wrinkled, a bottle of wine in one hand and a cigar in the other.
"What appen to you?" He asks. "Well, da farmer gave me bottle of wine, his wife, a cigar, then dere 19 year old daughter made wild passionate love to me."
"My God! What did you tell dem?" asked President Hussein. The driver answered: "Good evening, I am Saddam Hussein's chauffeur and I have just killed da pig."
Saddam Hussein and his chauffeur were rolling down the highway when suddenly they hit a pig crossing the road. They killed it instantly.
Saddam tells his driver: "Go to da farm over dere and hexplain to da honer of da pig what appened. "One hour later, Saddam sees his driver coming back from the farm, his clothes all wrinkled, a bottle of wine in one hand and a cigar in the other.
"What appen to you?" He asks. "Well, da farmer gave me bottle of wine, his wife, a cigar, then dere 19 year old daughter made wild passionate love to me."
"My God! What did you tell dem?" asked President Hussein. The driver answered: "Good evening, I am Saddam Hussein's chauffeur and I have just killed da pig."
Self-promo time: here's a piece I did for Slate on the Non-Jazeera's, the satellite TV stations in the Middle East that no one seems to write about.
The journalist Michael Kelly has been killed in Iraq, another accidental victim in a war of accidental victims (at least on the coalition side). The New Republic, which fired Kelly because Martin Peretz couldn't stomach his distaste for the hypocrticial Al Gore, prepared this appreciation.
They love their Saddam
Lebanon's LBCI satellite station has broadcast footage of Saddam being cheered by the throngs today in the streets of Baghdad. Was it him? I never saw Saddam giving high-fives before, like this character did, but the Great Man's powerful and ever-present personal secretary, Abed Hammoud, was with him--perhaps undermining my theory that Saddam is in Tikrit, surrounded by tribesmen, ready to fight like Abdel Qader al-Jazairi...
Then again it might have been Hammoud's double.
Lebanon's LBCI satellite station has broadcast footage of Saddam being cheered by the throngs today in the streets of Baghdad. Was it him? I never saw Saddam giving high-fives before, like this character did, but the Great Man's powerful and ever-present personal secretary, Abed Hammoud, was with him--perhaps undermining my theory that Saddam is in Tikrit, surrounded by tribesmen, ready to fight like Abdel Qader al-Jazairi...
Then again it might have been Hammoud's double.
Here's the latest entry in Kanan Makiya's war diaries in the New Republic. He writes from the front line in Nashville, and has his enemy in the cross-hairs: the State Department.
Syrian maneuvers
A report in Kuwait's daily Al-Rai al-Aam on Wednesday, citing American sources, says U.S. Special Forces blew up part of the Syrian-Iraqi pipeline (between Kirkuk and Banyas), which the two countries had used to illegally transport Iraqi oil to Syria outside the oil-for-food program. The way the system worked was that Iraq would sell the oil at below-market rates to Syria, which would then use it for domestic consumption, releasing its own oil for export (obviously at market rates): this earned Syria a hefty subsidy factor estimated at some $1bn per year.
The report also said that part of the rail link between Iraq and Syria was destroyed--the line had linked Syria to Iran as well, bringing thousands of Iranian pilgrims to Shiite shrines in Damascus.
The U.S. sources told the paper that this signaled the beginning of a political campaign against Syria, after Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld last week accused Syria of supplying Iraq with military equipment (a charge repeated yesterday). There are some questions as to whether Syria acted as a transit point for Russian weapons, something I haven't been able to establish. The Kuwaiti story also noted that U.S. assistant secretary of state for the Middle East, William Burns, visited Damascus a few days ago and presented officials there with "firm evidence" of Rumsfeld's charge.
Everything, however, is in the symbolism: the cutoffs were a warning that a postwar Iraq will not look kindly on Syria if it continues to support Saddam--a sanction with an obvious economic cost.
Al-Rai al-Aam also had another very interesting news item yesterday suggesting that the Sharif Ali, the Hashemite pretender to the Iraqi throne and leader of the Constitutional Monarchy movement, secretly visited Damascus for 24 hours last February "in response to a formal invitation. He met officials at the highest level", which means he saw Syrian president Bashar Asad. His visit was supposedly (a) to prepare for the Sharif's transit (and short residence) through Syria before his return to Iraq, (b) to see about Syrian help in setting up meetings with Iraqi tribal chiefs, (c) to see about Syria's facilitating the operations of the Constitutional Monarchists in Syria, and (d) helping them enter Iraq, by way of Mosul.
Many interesting items here: first, it shows that Asad is maneuvering for a place in postwar Iraq, something already obvious late last year when he met with the two Iraqi Kurdish leaders Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani; it also means that, despite the rhetoric, the Syrians are pragmatically dealing with Saddam's possible successors; it means also that whatever the talk of a fundamental rift between the U.S. and Syria, both countries can actually agree on aspects of postwar policy, since the U.S. is not at all hostile to the Sharif, quite the contrary.
And it means that a republican Baathist regime has no basic problem with assisting in the return of an Arab monarchy. That's not only a useful statement on the value of ideology in the Middle East, but perhaps recognition by Asad that he, too, is a republican monarch.
What Sistani said
There is confusion over reports that Ayatollah Sistani had issued a fatwa permitting Shiites to allow coalition forces to continue their operations. However, that appears to have since been denied, which leads in Beirut’s Al-Safir, but that also seems to be corroborated by the appearance on Iraq satellite of whom I believe was Sistani declaring his opposition to the invasion.
This requires more context, however, and I hope to provide some anon.
Go figure
I'm trying to square this statement (here):
"Now that we have penetrated Baghdad's outer ring, the likelihood [of a chemical or biological attack] is negligible," said Captain Adam Mastrianni, the intelligence officer of the 101st Airborne Division's Aviation Brigade.
With this statement, by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld yesterday (which you can find here):
And [Rumsfeld] said he believed the Iraqis may not have used chemical weapons thus far because ‘"maybe they are holding out because they think there may be a deal."
Thursday, April 03, 2003
Syria and the U.S.
Interesting material on the Syrian-U.S. front, but I will have to post that all tomorrow and Saturday, including links, as I have no time now. But for a peek ahead, you might want to check Instapundit and Glenn Reynolds' link to a World Tribune report from Kuwait's Al-Rai al-Aam (which I have right here) noting that U.S. special forces destroyed part of the Kirkuk-Banyas pipeline, which Syria was using to illegally import oil from Iraq outside the oil-for-food program--earning Syria some $1bn.
Interesting material on the Syrian-U.S. front, but I will have to post that all tomorrow and Saturday, including links, as I have no time now. But for a peek ahead, you might want to check Instapundit and Glenn Reynolds' link to a World Tribune report from Kuwait's Al-Rai al-Aam (which I have right here) noting that U.S. special forces destroyed part of the Kirkuk-Banyas pipeline, which Syria was using to illegally import oil from Iraq outside the oil-for-food program--earning Syria some $1bn.
Flexible
This from the Washington Post:
Brooks said a senior Shiite Muslim theologian with the rank of grand ayatollah, highest in the Shiite hierarchy, who had been held under house arrest by the Iraqis, had ordered local people in Najaf not to interfere with the U.S.-led invasion troops.
"A prominent cleric, Grand Ayatollah Sistani, who had been placed under house arrest by the regime for a considerable period of time, issued a fatwa," or religious decree, Brooks said.
It is interesting that Sistani had issued an earlier fatwa--no doubt under government duress--declaring a jihad against any invaders. It was this earlier fatwa that Syrian foreign ministry official Butheina Shaaban had cited to me as proof that Iraq's Shiites would not support an outside military attack.
We'll have to see, now, won't we?
Out of Baghdad
Two of Al-Jazeera's correspondents have been expelled from Baghdad, which has led the station to suspend all live broadcasts from Iraq. The question is why? I propose three entirely spurious theories:
(1) The Iraqis are going to defend themselves in Baghdad in ways they would prefer not to show;
(2) If the regime loses power, it doesn't want this shown on TV so that its base of support elsewhere collapses (which might suggest a Tikrit option--the royal family fleeing Baghdad to its tribal homeland); and
(3) They thought Peter Arnett was more their type and want to revive his career by giving him exclusivity.
Apologies to readers for the slow download time in some areas. If anybody has ideas on how to speed things up, please send an email to this temporary address: mdy100@hotmail.com. Like Donald Rumsfeld I'm fighting this blog war on the cheap, which means some aspects of the site are less than ideal.
Wednesday, April 02, 2003
Khazraji watch update
According to the Al-Arabiya satellite station, the Danish government has asked the U.S. for information on Gen. Nizar Khazraji. This is the first serious indication that the Danes suspect Washington of having possibly been involved in his disappearance from house arrest in Denmark two weeks ago.
According to the Al-Arabiya satellite station, the Danish government has asked the U.S. for information on Gen. Nizar Khazraji. This is the first serious indication that the Danes suspect Washington of having possibly been involved in his disappearance from house arrest in Denmark two weeks ago.
Ambushing Ajami
Sunday evening the Lebanese LBCI satellite channel interviewed American-Lebanese academic Fouad Ajami on its The Event show, with Shada Omar. What started as a talk-show quickly turned into an ambush. On the show, too, was former Iraqi minister Abdel Razzaq Hashemi. Predictably, Hashemi spent the program personally attacking Ajami, who supports the Iraq campaign and is indeed one of its ideologues.
More surprising was Omar's performance. Several times she cut Ajami off, and twice she departed from Iraq to suggest he was pro-Israeli. LBCI also allowed a viewer, one Bushra Khalil, to call in and report that former US president George Bush had allegedly said of Ajami: "No one hates the Arabs like him."
Ajami's reaction was interesting. Though he defended the Anglo-American attack as an opportunity to establish a new liberal order in the Middle East, it was only when he resorted to Shiite symbolism that I believed he scored points with the largely pro-Iraqi audience. He berated Hashemi, asking him about Saddam’s innumerable victims, prominent among them that of the Shiite cleric Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and his venerated sister Bint al-Huda, whom the Iraqi leader ordered savagely executed in 1980. A friend of mine recently informed me that Lebanese Hizbullah officials to this day speak of those murders with a quiver in their voice.
I was Fouad's student, and he was kind enough to invite me recently to give lectures at my alma mater, Johns Hokins SAIS. However, I had never heard him speak in Arabic and found very intriguing, and understandable in the context, his resort to the highly emotional Baqir al-Sadr and Bint al-Huda passion play, an essential moment in recent Shiite history in Iraq. It was ironical that only minutes before Ajami had described himself as "not an Arab, but an American of Arab origin, who left Lebanon as a young man and who took the U.S. nationality because I believe in American values."
I accept the latter statement at face value, but was genuinely fascinated by his ability to invoke a powerful Arab image. Fascinated, and happy to see his detractors hunt for an impossible response to such an elemental example of Saddam's brutality--but also to a challenge spoken in a language they could understand, since his earlier comments on a liberal order fell largely on deaf ears.
Sunday evening the Lebanese LBCI satellite channel interviewed American-Lebanese academic Fouad Ajami on its The Event show, with Shada Omar. What started as a talk-show quickly turned into an ambush. On the show, too, was former Iraqi minister Abdel Razzaq Hashemi. Predictably, Hashemi spent the program personally attacking Ajami, who supports the Iraq campaign and is indeed one of its ideologues.
More surprising was Omar's performance. Several times she cut Ajami off, and twice she departed from Iraq to suggest he was pro-Israeli. LBCI also allowed a viewer, one Bushra Khalil, to call in and report that former US president George Bush had allegedly said of Ajami: "No one hates the Arabs like him."
Ajami's reaction was interesting. Though he defended the Anglo-American attack as an opportunity to establish a new liberal order in the Middle East, it was only when he resorted to Shiite symbolism that I believed he scored points with the largely pro-Iraqi audience. He berated Hashemi, asking him about Saddam’s innumerable victims, prominent among them that of the Shiite cleric Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and his venerated sister Bint al-Huda, whom the Iraqi leader ordered savagely executed in 1980. A friend of mine recently informed me that Lebanese Hizbullah officials to this day speak of those murders with a quiver in their voice.
I was Fouad's student, and he was kind enough to invite me recently to give lectures at my alma mater, Johns Hokins SAIS. However, I had never heard him speak in Arabic and found very intriguing, and understandable in the context, his resort to the highly emotional Baqir al-Sadr and Bint al-Huda passion play, an essential moment in recent Shiite history in Iraq. It was ironical that only minutes before Ajami had described himself as "not an Arab, but an American of Arab origin, who left Lebanon as a young man and who took the U.S. nationality because I believe in American values."
I accept the latter statement at face value, but was genuinely fascinated by his ability to invoke a powerful Arab image. Fascinated, and happy to see his detractors hunt for an impossible response to such an elemental example of Saddam's brutality--but also to a challenge spoken in a language they could understand, since his earlier comments on a liberal order fell largely on deaf ears.
From a captured Iraqi position John Simpson of the BBC reported further evidence that Iraqi forces have at least been preparing for chemical warfare. This included the discovery of stocks of protective atropine and a document listing the duties of an officer in training troops in the use of chemical weapons. In a posting several weeks ago, BC reported on a Radio France International interview with a Republican Guard defector in the north. He described weekly training in the use of chemical weapons.
Simpson did add, however, that no weapons stocks were discovered. That raises several questions: Are the Iraqis bluffing? Were the weapons removed before the Iraqis left? Or, more likely, are chemical weapons being held by specific units under more direct orders from the regime?
Tuesday, April 01, 2003
Bad news Barry
I recommend reading Barry McCaffrey's splendidly duplicitous article in today’s Opinion Journal, with his North Korean superlatives as he simultaneously criticizes the military plan for the invasion of Iraq and kisses up to his comrades in the field.
We can learn for example that Saddam survived a "brilliant first strike on his headquarters" (so brilliant, in fact, that he survived it), by using "every cruel and illegal tool in his menu of options to blunt the attack and seek increasing opposition to the U.S. by the international and Muslim communities." McCaffrey goes on for awhile, but basically to set the reader up for this:
The "rolling start" concept of the attack dictated by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has put us in a temporarily risky position. We face a war of maneuver in the coming days to destroy five Iraqi armor divisions with only one U.S. armored unit (the Third Mechanized Infantry) supported by the modest armor forces of the First Marine Division and the Apache attack helicopters of the 101st Airborne. We will succeed in this battle because of the bravery and skill of our soldiers and Marines combined with the ferocious lethality of the air power we will bring to bear on the enemy force.
Decoding: Rumsfeld okayed a pretty shitty plan so U.S. forces are ridiculously outnumbered, but we pray that we’ll end up winning because (a) we have airplanes and the Iraqis don’t and (b) our men, hopefully, will fight like sonofabitches.
I can go on, but won’t. McCaffrey subsequently sets even more complex conditions for U.S. success, so that by the end you’re ready to pop the cyanide, and he’s ready to propose this:
If we shrink from using direct and overwhelming violence on the SRG and the Fedayeen, we will risk thousands of casualties in our Army and Marine assault forces and leave in place an unintimidated, even emboldened, terrorist threat that will make our subsequent occupation of the city [Baghdad] an unending horror.
In other words, let's carpet-bomb. Maybe that will indeed be the U.S. choice. You’ll recall what McCaffrey did to that Iraqi column back in Kuwait in 1991, converting it (apparently quite unnecessarily according to Seymour Hersh) into corned beef.
I recommend reading Barry McCaffrey's splendidly duplicitous article in today’s Opinion Journal, with his North Korean superlatives as he simultaneously criticizes the military plan for the invasion of Iraq and kisses up to his comrades in the field.
We can learn for example that Saddam survived a "brilliant first strike on his headquarters" (so brilliant, in fact, that he survived it), by using "every cruel and illegal tool in his menu of options to blunt the attack and seek increasing opposition to the U.S. by the international and Muslim communities." McCaffrey goes on for awhile, but basically to set the reader up for this:
The "rolling start" concept of the attack dictated by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has put us in a temporarily risky position. We face a war of maneuver in the coming days to destroy five Iraqi armor divisions with only one U.S. armored unit (the Third Mechanized Infantry) supported by the modest armor forces of the First Marine Division and the Apache attack helicopters of the 101st Airborne. We will succeed in this battle because of the bravery and skill of our soldiers and Marines combined with the ferocious lethality of the air power we will bring to bear on the enemy force.
Decoding: Rumsfeld okayed a pretty shitty plan so U.S. forces are ridiculously outnumbered, but we pray that we’ll end up winning because (a) we have airplanes and the Iraqis don’t and (b) our men, hopefully, will fight like sonofabitches.
I can go on, but won’t. McCaffrey subsequently sets even more complex conditions for U.S. success, so that by the end you’re ready to pop the cyanide, and he’s ready to propose this:
If we shrink from using direct and overwhelming violence on the SRG and the Fedayeen, we will risk thousands of casualties in our Army and Marine assault forces and leave in place an unintimidated, even emboldened, terrorist threat that will make our subsequent occupation of the city [Baghdad] an unending horror.
In other words, let's carpet-bomb. Maybe that will indeed be the U.S. choice. You’ll recall what McCaffrey did to that Iraqi column back in Kuwait in 1991, converting it (apparently quite unnecessarily according to Seymour Hersh) into corned beef.
Blaming Arnett
It wasn't enough for Peter Arnett to fraternize with the Iraqis, he had to go lure Walter Cronkite out of the morgue.
The old man penned a comment in today's New York Times redolent with High Church ambiguity: Arnett, or rather "Mr. Arnett hangs by a rope of his own weaving," wrote Cronkite: "His long experience makes it all the more difficult to understand how he could have been so grossly irresponsible in granting that interview. He besmirched his reputation, offended a nation and lost his job -- justifiably so -- even though he will still report for The Daily Mirror in Britain."
But then Cronkite admitted that Arnett did what any reporter would have done: "Clearly Mr. Arnett, in granting the interview, was cozying up to sources he depended on for, first, their tolerance of him in Baghdad and, second, any information he could get: about Iraq's military posture, its claims of combat successes and techniques, and the morale of its populace."
Then he concluded: "But Mr. Arnett's firing is more than a personal setback. With him gone from the airwaves, Americans have lost an eye on Baghdad that had proved a valuable addition to our knowledge of a mysterious enemy."
Guess that means Cronkite will have to watch Al-Jazeera like the rest of us.
It wasn't enough for Peter Arnett to fraternize with the Iraqis, he had to go lure Walter Cronkite out of the morgue.
The old man penned a comment in today's New York Times redolent with High Church ambiguity: Arnett, or rather "Mr. Arnett hangs by a rope of his own weaving," wrote Cronkite: "His long experience makes it all the more difficult to understand how he could have been so grossly irresponsible in granting that interview. He besmirched his reputation, offended a nation and lost his job -- justifiably so -- even though he will still report for The Daily Mirror in Britain."
But then Cronkite admitted that Arnett did what any reporter would have done: "Clearly Mr. Arnett, in granting the interview, was cozying up to sources he depended on for, first, their tolerance of him in Baghdad and, second, any information he could get: about Iraq's military posture, its claims of combat successes and techniques, and the morale of its populace."
Then he concluded: "But Mr. Arnett's firing is more than a personal setback. With him gone from the airwaves, Americans have lost an eye on Baghdad that had proved a valuable addition to our knowledge of a mysterious enemy."
Guess that means Cronkite will have to watch Al-Jazeera like the rest of us.
Monday, March 31, 2003
Too sanguine
Matthias on this website disagrees with my assessment that things are heating up in Beirut: "Yeah, there are some 'incidents'," he writes, "but nothing truly dangerous has happened."
In fact several incidents have been ignored or consciously played down in the Lebanese media. A large bomb in Sidon was placed outside the home of a Dutch woman, injuring several people. A bomb blew up outside the British Council not long afterward. A few days ago an American had a gun pulled on him in a taxi, and he soon intends to leave the country. And the suicide bomb threat at the HSBC bank on Saturday has reportedly scared another foreigner away.
No, I certainly don't think it's time to panic, nor are these threats organized. Moreover, the Lebanese authorities have a vested interest in ensuring that foreigners are well protected. However, in times like these it's the lone nut who poses the greatest threat, which is why it is best not to be too sanguine about the mood in the country.
Khazraji watch roundup
I've received mail from various people suspicious about what has happened to Gen. Nizar Khazraji, the former Iraqi chief-of-staff, who disappeared from Denmark a few weeks ago while being investigated for possible war crimes.
Kendall Harmon, who hosts the Titusonenine blog referred me to this article from the English-language Copenhagen Post, which itself referred to an article in the Danish B.T. tabloid claiming the CIA was responsible for his being spirited out from under the nose of Danish police. Tom Scudder sent me this website being maintained by Kynn, with several links on the matter (including an Iranian news agency report suggesting Khazraji is or was in Qatar).
Harmon has a more detailed account of events in Denmark and the controversy provoked there by the disappearance, with one source suggesting Khazraji is in Irbil, with the Kurds. The London-based Al-Sharq al-Awsat has also reported he is in Iraq, and moved there through Kuwait and Turkey. Finally, someone on an email list I belong to cited unconfirmed reports (indeed he called them rumors) that Khazraji was in Saudi Arabia.
All this is intriguing, given that it is improbable Iraqi agents abducted Khazraji. All I can add to the debate is to say there is as yet no clear proof of American, let alone CIA involvement, only assumptions. It certainly smells fishy, though.
I've received mail from various people suspicious about what has happened to Gen. Nizar Khazraji, the former Iraqi chief-of-staff, who disappeared from Denmark a few weeks ago while being investigated for possible war crimes.
Kendall Harmon, who hosts the Titusonenine blog referred me to this article from the English-language Copenhagen Post, which itself referred to an article in the Danish B.T. tabloid claiming the CIA was responsible for his being spirited out from under the nose of Danish police. Tom Scudder sent me this website being maintained by Kynn, with several links on the matter (including an Iranian news agency report suggesting Khazraji is or was in Qatar).
Harmon has a more detailed account of events in Denmark and the controversy provoked there by the disappearance, with one source suggesting Khazraji is in Irbil, with the Kurds. The London-based Al-Sharq al-Awsat has also reported he is in Iraq, and moved there through Kuwait and Turkey. Finally, someone on an email list I belong to cited unconfirmed reports (indeed he called them rumors) that Khazraji was in Saudi Arabia.
All this is intriguing, given that it is improbable Iraqi agents abducted Khazraji. All I can add to the debate is to say there is as yet no clear proof of American, let alone CIA involvement, only assumptions. It certainly smells fishy, though.
My friend Chibli Mallat has written this article for The Times of London in which he defends the deployment of human rights monitors in Iraq. If Murdoch makes you pay, you can access the article at Mallat's personal site: www.mallat.com.
Horrible thought
Britain has just denied an earlier report that it captured an Iraqi general. Last week the coalition sort of admitted that the 51st Iraqi division had not surrendered, as announced earlier. Before that it also sort of admitted that several Iraqi senior officials were not killed in the "decapitation attack" of two weeks ago, despite earlier statements to the contrary. And yesterday the U.S. denied that the Army and the Marines had stalled on their way to Baghdad, even as they, well, stalled...
When will they grasp that because of these mistakes people are actually beginning to believe the Iraqi version?
Powell's comeback?
Important article in the Washington Post suggesting that Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz may be in trouble (thanks to Mike Alissi's posting on Reason's Hit and Run).
The story notes:
Already there is a behind-the-scenes effort by former senior Republican government officials and party leaders to convince President Bush that the advice he has received from Vice President Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz -- a powerful triumvirate frequently at odds with Secretary of State Colin L. Powell -- has been wrong and even dangerous to long-term U.S. national interests.
Don't write the three off just yet, but the wolves are circling, which means Saddam may not be the only one who has something to lose in Iraq.
Important article in the Washington Post suggesting that Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz may be in trouble (thanks to Mike Alissi's posting on Reason's Hit and Run).
The story notes:
Already there is a behind-the-scenes effort by former senior Republican government officials and party leaders to convince President Bush that the advice he has received from Vice President Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz -- a powerful triumvirate frequently at odds with Secretary of State Colin L. Powell -- has been wrong and even dangerous to long-term U.S. national interests.
Don't write the three off just yet, but the wolves are circling, which means Saddam may not be the only one who has something to lose in Iraq.
Screwed?
Colin Powell launched a broadside against both Iran and Syria yesterday before the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. On Syria he said:
Syria can continue direct support for terrorist groups and the dying regime of Saddam Hussein, or it can embark on a different and more hopeful course. Either way, Syria has the responsibility for its choices and for the consequences.
This followed Donald Rumsfeld's accusations last Friday that Syria was providing military equipment, including night-vision goggles, to Iraq. However, looking at the broader picture, it is worth placing this in the context of information provided by Seymour Hersh in his article on Rumsfeld that has provoked so much controversy in Washington. Overlooked was the last paragraph in the story, which noted:
There is also evidence that Turkey has been playing both sides. Turkey and Syria, who traditionally have not had close relations, recently agreed to strengthen their ties, the businessman told me, and early this year Syria sent Major General Ghazi Kanaan, its longtime strongman and power broker in Lebanon, to Turkey. The two nations have begun to share intelligence and to meet, along with Iranian officials, to discuss border issues, in case an independent Kurdistan emerges from the Iraq war. A former U.S. intelligence officer put it this way: "The Syrians are coordinating with the Turks to screw us in the north--to cause us problems." He added, "Syria and the Iranians agreed that they could not let an American occupation of Iraq stand."
Colin Powell launched a broadside against both Iran and Syria yesterday before the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. On Syria he said:
Syria can continue direct support for terrorist groups and the dying regime of Saddam Hussein, or it can embark on a different and more hopeful course. Either way, Syria has the responsibility for its choices and for the consequences.
This followed Donald Rumsfeld's accusations last Friday that Syria was providing military equipment, including night-vision goggles, to Iraq. However, looking at the broader picture, it is worth placing this in the context of information provided by Seymour Hersh in his article on Rumsfeld that has provoked so much controversy in Washington. Overlooked was the last paragraph in the story, which noted:
There is also evidence that Turkey has been playing both sides. Turkey and Syria, who traditionally have not had close relations, recently agreed to strengthen their ties, the businessman told me, and early this year Syria sent Major General Ghazi Kanaan, its longtime strongman and power broker in Lebanon, to Turkey. The two nations have begun to share intelligence and to meet, along with Iranian officials, to discuss border issues, in case an independent Kurdistan emerges from the Iraq war. A former U.S. intelligence officer put it this way: "The Syrians are coordinating with the Turks to screw us in the north--to cause us problems." He added, "Syria and the Iranians agreed that they could not let an American occupation of Iraq stand."
Perle of wisdom
You can find Richard Perle's response to his detractors, here, from the Wall Street Journal-Opinion Journal. At least he didn't call Seymour Hersh a "terrorist" again.
You can find Richard Perle's response to his detractors, here, from the Wall Street Journal-Opinion Journal. At least he didn't call Seymour Hersh a "terrorist" again.
Sunday, March 30, 2003
Lebanon's Shiites and Iraq
From Lebanon, one of the things to watch in the future is just how the country's Shiite community reacts to events in Iraq. Being discussed by many local commentators is the possibility that an Iraq freed of Saddam (and the U.S.) will emerge as an alternative to Iran as a source of religious and political inspiration to Lebanese Shiites.
Indeed, Arab Iraq is even more essential to Shiite history than Persian Iran, and a part of Lebanon's Shiite clergy was trained there, so this would hardly represent a fundamental shift.
Indeed, both Hizbullah and a senior Shiite cleric, Sayyid Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah (who was educated at Najaf, in Iraq), have been highly critical of the U.S. and British attack, though they have carefully couched their opposition in the dual language of anti-Americanism and support for the Iraqi people, not the Baath regime. Their contempt for Saddam is unsurpassed, as they remember his murder of Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (and his sister) in the early 1980s, among many other crimes.
From Hizbullah's perspective the Iraq conflict offers many advantages, to compliment the party's sustained support for the Intifada: it gives Hizbullah a regional reach which it has systematically sought to expand since the end of the Israeli occupation of south Lebanon in May 2000; it keeps the party close to its Shiite roots, in such a way that if the clerical regime in Iran is removed from power, Hizbullah will be able to replace it with a new spring of religious legitimacy; and it gives the party a fallback position if the U.S. presence in Iraq forces Syria to curtail Hizbullah's political and military margin of maneuver in southern Lebanon.
It also allows the party, somewhat cynically, to hook onto and benefit from anti-American crusade in the region that it neither initiated nor sustains.
Given all this, one might also see the emergence of even more of a rivalry between Hizbullah and Fadlallah, who have been on relatively bad terms in recent years, though there continues to be a mistaken impression in the West that Fadlallah (who was never even in the party's hierarchy) is Hizbullah's spiritual leader.
From Lebanon, one of the things to watch in the future is just how the country's Shiite community reacts to events in Iraq. Being discussed by many local commentators is the possibility that an Iraq freed of Saddam (and the U.S.) will emerge as an alternative to Iran as a source of religious and political inspiration to Lebanese Shiites.
Indeed, Arab Iraq is even more essential to Shiite history than Persian Iran, and a part of Lebanon's Shiite clergy was trained there, so this would hardly represent a fundamental shift.
Indeed, both Hizbullah and a senior Shiite cleric, Sayyid Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah (who was educated at Najaf, in Iraq), have been highly critical of the U.S. and British attack, though they have carefully couched their opposition in the dual language of anti-Americanism and support for the Iraqi people, not the Baath regime. Their contempt for Saddam is unsurpassed, as they remember his murder of Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr (and his sister) in the early 1980s, among many other crimes.
From Hizbullah's perspective the Iraq conflict offers many advantages, to compliment the party's sustained support for the Intifada: it gives Hizbullah a regional reach which it has systematically sought to expand since the end of the Israeli occupation of south Lebanon in May 2000; it keeps the party close to its Shiite roots, in such a way that if the clerical regime in Iran is removed from power, Hizbullah will be able to replace it with a new spring of religious legitimacy; and it gives the party a fallback position if the U.S. presence in Iraq forces Syria to curtail Hizbullah's political and military margin of maneuver in southern Lebanon.
It also allows the party, somewhat cynically, to hook onto and benefit from anti-American crusade in the region that it neither initiated nor sustains.
Given all this, one might also see the emergence of even more of a rivalry between Hizbullah and Fadlallah, who have been on relatively bad terms in recent years, though there continues to be a mistaken impression in the West that Fadlallah (who was never even in the party's hierarchy) is Hizbullah's spiritual leader.
Rummy the dummy?
Currently making the headlines is a report that the New Yorker has published an article indicating that US defense secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, overruled his military brass and prevented them from dispatching a larger force to Iraq. The implication is that he was responsible for the difficulties the troops are having today, in particular in their advance on Baghdad.
Several other articles have been published on the subject, and a good start is this Mickey Kaus posting in Slate, with plenty of links, including this one to a GovExec.com article and this one to a Washington Post article..
Kaus argues that the reason Rumsfeld kept the numbers low was not merely to prove his point that a small force could win a war (Rumsfeld doctrine versus Powell doctrine), but to ensure the U.S. could subsequently attack myriad enemies again in Middle East or elsewhere--since an easy war mobilizing relatively few troops would mean future wars would be that much easier a sell to the American public.
Maybe Kaus is right, but what we can already say with definite proof is that the brass are begin to talk, which means they don't want to be scapegoats. And in that context, though the war will or might be won, the officers seem to be preparing the public for a fairly sordid and bloody affair (and Rumsfeld for a heartier use of force that might undermine his political aims).
Currently making the headlines is a report that the New Yorker has published an article indicating that US defense secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, overruled his military brass and prevented them from dispatching a larger force to Iraq. The implication is that he was responsible for the difficulties the troops are having today, in particular in their advance on Baghdad.
Several other articles have been published on the subject, and a good start is this Mickey Kaus posting in Slate, with plenty of links, including this one to a GovExec.com article and this one to a Washington Post article..
Kaus argues that the reason Rumsfeld kept the numbers low was not merely to prove his point that a small force could win a war (Rumsfeld doctrine versus Powell doctrine), but to ensure the U.S. could subsequently attack myriad enemies again in Middle East or elsewhere--since an easy war mobilizing relatively few troops would mean future wars would be that much easier a sell to the American public.
Maybe Kaus is right, but what we can already say with definite proof is that the brass are begin to talk, which means they don't want to be scapegoats. And in that context, though the war will or might be won, the officers seem to be preparing the public for a fairly sordid and bloody affair (and Rumsfeld for a heartier use of force that might undermine his political aims).
Saturday, March 29, 2003
Grand alliance
I have received the list of countries belonging to the Coalition of the Willing:
United States, Britain, Spain, Australia, Kuwait, Poland, Albania, Romania, Czech Republic, Portugal, Japan, South Korea, Denmark, Netherlands, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Macedonia, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Georgia, Philippines, Uzbekistan, Colombia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Honduras, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda, Iceland, Singapore, Mongolia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau, Panama.
I have received the list of countries belonging to the Coalition of the Willing:
United States, Britain, Spain, Australia, Kuwait, Poland, Albania, Romania, Czech Republic, Portugal, Japan, South Korea, Denmark, Netherlands, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Macedonia, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Georgia, Philippines, Uzbekistan, Colombia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Honduras, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda, Iceland, Singapore, Mongolia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau, Panama.
A man threatened to blow himself up at a Beirut branch of the HSBC bank. I was asked by the Sunday Times to cover the story, before being called back and told the whole thing was over. This may seem like a joke, but foreign embassies remain extremely worried about possible incidents against their civilians in Lebanon, something the Lebanese authorities have tried very strenuously to play down.
A few months ago an American woman was killed in Sidon. Last weekend, a bomb blew up next to the apartment of a Dutch lady, also in Sidon, and several people were injured. It's not clear if the two incidents were linked, but the American and Dutch women didn't know each other, despite a false claim in the Lebanese newspaper Al-Liwaa.
Here's my weekly comment for the Lebanon section of the Daily Star, on the antiwar demonstrations here. I suggest that the demonstrators offer no third alternative to U.S. occupation or more of Saddam's brutality.
Errr, Sorry
The Labor government has apologized to the families of two British servicemen who Tony Blair had suggested on Thursday were executed in cold blood. As it turned out, there was no definite proof confirming Blair's statement.
Has the Bush administration apologized for suggesting, also with little evidence, that some of the American mechanics captured last weekend at Nasiriyya were executed? This was the claim made by U.S. officials (in this New York Times article) and, later on, by a senior officer on the Larry King Show. If there is definite evidence, then it should be released; if there is none, then why needlessly worry the families?
I think (and very much hope) the PoW's are still alive--so many additional shields Saddam can place in Baghdad when the siege of the city begins, or bargaining chips if he has to negotiate his way out of the city if the U.S. is forced to bargain.
The Labor government has apologized to the families of two British servicemen who Tony Blair had suggested on Thursday were executed in cold blood. As it turned out, there was no definite proof confirming Blair's statement.
Has the Bush administration apologized for suggesting, also with little evidence, that some of the American mechanics captured last weekend at Nasiriyya were executed? This was the claim made by U.S. officials (in this New York Times article) and, later on, by a senior officer on the Larry King Show. If there is definite evidence, then it should be released; if there is none, then why needlessly worry the families?
I think (and very much hope) the PoW's are still alive--so many additional shields Saddam can place in Baghdad when the siege of the city begins, or bargaining chips if he has to negotiate his way out of the city if the U.S. is forced to bargain.
Father knew best
Secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld has accused Syria of sending sophisticated military material, including night-vision goggles, to Iraq, and of allowing people through its border who want to fight the Americans. Rumsfeld described this as "hostile acts." The story was the headline here in the leading Lebanese paper, Al-Nahar, as well as the London-based Al-Hayat.
The Syrian denial was couched thus: "What Donald Rumsfeld said about the transportation of equipment from Syria to Iraq is an attempt to cover up what his forces have been committing against civilians in Iraq."
If the story is true, however, this would represent a remarkable risk for Syrian president Bashar Asad. The Syrian regime is indeed very worried about a U.S. force sitting on its eastern border, and when I was in Damascus a few months ago the mood was one of anxiety that "Syria would be second" after Iraq. Rumsfeld's comments will not help reassure the Syrians. However, I get a sense that Syrian policy is being driven by the die-hards who have largely transformed Bashar into a lowest common denominator of agreement between Syria's various power centers: the myriad intelligence services, the Baath party apparatchiks, the old elite, etc.
It is very possible that he would have approved a decision to send military material, and one cannot ignore that Bashar often believes in his militant rhetoric. However, I get a nagging sense that the idea may not have originated with him, but with those who fear (or should fear) a U.S. victory much more than he--the security apparatchiks whose raison d'etre would dissolve if the U.S. were successful in establishing themselves in Iraq and shaping events in the region.
I also get a nagging sense that Hafez Asad, Bashar's father, would have played this differently: he would have let the U.S. hang itself with its own rope, and the he would have entered the fray when he could negotiate something advantageous to himself, using U.S. difficulties as leverage. All Bashar has done is guarantee U.S. enmity, weakening his future bargaining hand.
His dilemma is this: he often has to be more radical than anyone in order to survive politically; but by raising the stakes, Bashar's strategy can mean his fall is that much harder if he fails. And if Bashar comes to be perceived as dangerously inexperienced because of his mistakes, his position in Syria could deteriorate.
Incidentally, you might want to read this version of the story on Israel's Ha'aretz site, which suggests that the U.S. attack on a Syrian bus several days ago (when several Syrian civilians were killed) might not have been unintentional after all.
Secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld has accused Syria of sending sophisticated military material, including night-vision goggles, to Iraq, and of allowing people through its border who want to fight the Americans. Rumsfeld described this as "hostile acts." The story was the headline here in the leading Lebanese paper, Al-Nahar, as well as the London-based Al-Hayat.
The Syrian denial was couched thus: "What Donald Rumsfeld said about the transportation of equipment from Syria to Iraq is an attempt to cover up what his forces have been committing against civilians in Iraq."
If the story is true, however, this would represent a remarkable risk for Syrian president Bashar Asad. The Syrian regime is indeed very worried about a U.S. force sitting on its eastern border, and when I was in Damascus a few months ago the mood was one of anxiety that "Syria would be second" after Iraq. Rumsfeld's comments will not help reassure the Syrians. However, I get a sense that Syrian policy is being driven by the die-hards who have largely transformed Bashar into a lowest common denominator of agreement between Syria's various power centers: the myriad intelligence services, the Baath party apparatchiks, the old elite, etc.
It is very possible that he would have approved a decision to send military material, and one cannot ignore that Bashar often believes in his militant rhetoric. However, I get a nagging sense that the idea may not have originated with him, but with those who fear (or should fear) a U.S. victory much more than he--the security apparatchiks whose raison d'etre would dissolve if the U.S. were successful in establishing themselves in Iraq and shaping events in the region.
I also get a nagging sense that Hafez Asad, Bashar's father, would have played this differently: he would have let the U.S. hang itself with its own rope, and the he would have entered the fray when he could negotiate something advantageous to himself, using U.S. difficulties as leverage. All Bashar has done is guarantee U.S. enmity, weakening his future bargaining hand.
His dilemma is this: he often has to be more radical than anyone in order to survive politically; but by raising the stakes, Bashar's strategy can mean his fall is that much harder if he fails. And if Bashar comes to be perceived as dangerously inexperienced because of his mistakes, his position in Syria could deteriorate.
Incidentally, you might want to read this version of the story on Israel's Ha'aretz site, which suggests that the U.S. attack on a Syrian bus several days ago (when several Syrian civilians were killed) might not have been unintentional after all.
Friday, March 28, 2003
Were two British soldiers brutally executed by the Iraqis? As I was watching Tony Blair recount the killing of the two on CNN, the station was running a story on the ticker-tape below the image that the two men killed were not soldiers at all, but probably humanitarian workers, and it cited the British Army for this clarification.
Now we have this from The Guardian, informing us:
Tony Blair appeared to backtrack yesterday when his official spokesman said there was no "absolute evidence" that two British soldiers who were killed after being separated from their unit in southern Iraq were executed, as the prime minister had earlier suggested.
The clarification doesn't deny suspicion of cold-blooded murder, but I'm wondering what happened to that story run on CNN? The mystery is hardly resolved by the fact that the two men were positively identified yesterday as British soldiers.
Now we have this from The Guardian, informing us:
Tony Blair appeared to backtrack yesterday when his official spokesman said there was no "absolute evidence" that two British soldiers who were killed after being separated from their unit in southern Iraq were executed, as the prime minister had earlier suggested.
The clarification doesn't deny suspicion of cold-blooded murder, but I'm wondering what happened to that story run on CNN? The mystery is hardly resolved by the fact that the two men were positively identified yesterday as British soldiers.
Al-Jazeera has gotten a beating in the West, both figuratively and literally. The Qatari station has been accused of being a propaganda tool for the Iraqi regime, and earlier this week the station’s website was closed down by hackers (thanks to Scott for this link). Reportedly, it will take a few days for the site to be up and running again.
Panoptical war
Criticism of Al-Jazeera is legitimate; the station is not objective--nor for that matter are any of the other stations covering the Iraqi conflict. The sky is thick with political agendas, conscious and unconscious. However, critics of the station should bear in mind that Al-Jazeera is the flip side to the emir of Qatar’s hosting of U.S. Central Command, and, therefore, serves as his protection in the Arab world. Even as he allows the station to play its pan-Arab line, the emir is a vital link in the American war effort.
This is the first genuine Panoptical war (from Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon—“a model prison in which all inmates would be observable at all times by unseen guards,” as Reason’s Ron Bailey explained it) in the sense that this is the first crisis in which the conflict can be viewed from all sides by all categories viewers, as opposed to the 1991 Gulf war which was mainly a CNN extravaganza. Today, nobody in the West or the Arab world feels satisfied with listening to one or two media outlets or news sites. Thanks to the market, viewers have a plethora of news sources, showing all sides of the conflict, so that each viewer can autonomously develop his or her own views (even unintentionally integrating views of media outlets they despise) of the war.
This mishmash might not generate complete accuracy or objectivity (an impossibility anyway), but it could move us as close as possible under present conditions. (And how many people really care about accuracy when a war is so polarizing?) It’s also important to understand that while Al-Jazeera does indeed often act like a propaganda outlet, it has been a liberating experience for the Arab publics, providing them with higher expectations from their own media. For example, Syrian satellite, which is hardly at the cutting edge of regional television, has been forced to kick itself out of its slumber and host day-long programs on the war.
Already, Al-Jazeera has to look over its shoulder at Al-Arabiyya, a Dubai-based station, and at Al-Hayat-LBCI, a venture between Lebanese LBCI and the Saudi daily Al-Hayat. This could explain the station’s penchant for sensationalistic atrocity reporting. In time, however, Arab stations will understand that accuracy is a better magnet, and the standards by which Al-Jazeera (and others) are judged inside the Middle East will be raised.
Hubris tamed?
For a newspaper that supported an Iraq war, the Washington Post is certainly doing a good job of showing why the whole thing is a bad idea. In a grim article yesterday titled "War could last months, officers say", the paper's Thomas Ricks reported:
Despite the rapid advance of Army and Marine forces across Iraq over the past week, some senior U.S. military officers are now convinced that the war is likely to last months and will require considerably more combat power than is now on hand there and in Kuwait, senior defense officials said yesterday.
And he quotes one senior officer as saying: "Tell me how this ends?"
The story does quote other officers as pooh-poohing the claims of the pessimists, but the catalogue of logistical difficulties, under-estimation of Iraqi resolve, and difficult choices over whether to attack Baghdad first or (as one officer put it) adopt a "Pac Man" approach of steady elimination of Iraqi military concentrations, suggests this could possibly turn into an election-year issue.
For a newspaper that supported an Iraq war, the Washington Post is certainly doing a good job of showing why the whole thing is a bad idea. In a grim article yesterday titled "War could last months, officers say", the paper's Thomas Ricks reported:
Despite the rapid advance of Army and Marine forces across Iraq over the past week, some senior U.S. military officers are now convinced that the war is likely to last months and will require considerably more combat power than is now on hand there and in Kuwait, senior defense officials said yesterday.
And he quotes one senior officer as saying: "Tell me how this ends?"
The story does quote other officers as pooh-poohing the claims of the pessimists, but the catalogue of logistical difficulties, under-estimation of Iraqi resolve, and difficult choices over whether to attack Baghdad first or (as one officer put it) adopt a "Pac Man" approach of steady elimination of Iraqi military concentrations, suggests this could possibly turn into an election-year issue.
News in that Richard Perle, the chairman of the Defense Advisory Board, has resigned.
This from an AP story:
In a brief written statement, Rumsfeld thanked Perle for his service and made no mention of why Perle resigned. He said he had asked Perle to remain as a member of the board.
And then this (more than probable) explanation:
Perle became embroiled in a recent controversy stemming from a New Yorker magazine article that said he had lunch in January with controversial Saudi-born businessman Adnan Khashoggi and a Saudi industrialist.
The industrialist, Harb Saleh Zuhair, was interested in investing in a venture capital firm, Trireme Partners, of which Perle is a managing partner. Nothing ever came of the lunch in Marseilles; no investment was made. But the New Yorker story, written by Seymour M. Hersh, suggested that Perle, a longtime critic of the Saudi regime, was inappropriately mixing business and politics.
This from an AP story:
In a brief written statement, Rumsfeld thanked Perle for his service and made no mention of why Perle resigned. He said he had asked Perle to remain as a member of the board.
And then this (more than probable) explanation:
Perle became embroiled in a recent controversy stemming from a New Yorker magazine article that said he had lunch in January with controversial Saudi-born businessman Adnan Khashoggi and a Saudi industrialist.
The industrialist, Harb Saleh Zuhair, was interested in investing in a venture capital firm, Trireme Partners, of which Perle is a managing partner. Nothing ever came of the lunch in Marseilles; no investment was made. But the New Yorker story, written by Seymour M. Hersh, suggested that Perle, a longtime critic of the Saudi regime, was inappropriately mixing business and politics.
Thursday, March 27, 2003
This from The Scotsman, on the formation of an Iraqi government in exile.
Here's the lede:
The Iraqi opposition has formed a government-in-waiting to assume office in Baghdad in the wake of Saddam Hussein’s downfall.
A four-man leadership committee of prominent opposition figures -- Ahmed Chalabi, Massoud Barzani, Jalal Talabani and Abul Aziz Hakim -- has been named at the head of the Iraqi Interim Authority.
and:
The Interim Authority has formed a joint command that will oversee the military activities of the main militias in the opposition which have been placed at the disposal of a US marines general, based in Kurdistan to oversee a northern front. It has also named 14 new committees to take control of important ministries in Baghdad as soon as the allied military command turns over power to a civilian authority.
The article speculates that the front-runner to succeed Saddam is Iraqi National Congress head, Ahmad Chalabi:
Powerful Pentagon sponsors of Ahmed Chalabi, the head of the Iraqi National Congress, have promoted the Shia banker as the obvious candidate to replace Saddam Hussein. Opposition from the State Department has faded since the launch of military action, said Mr Musawi, Mr Chalabi’s deputy and spokesman. Still, he conceded that the White House has still not signed up to the opposition scheme for a quick transfer of power.
Here's the lede:
The Iraqi opposition has formed a government-in-waiting to assume office in Baghdad in the wake of Saddam Hussein’s downfall.
A four-man leadership committee of prominent opposition figures -- Ahmed Chalabi, Massoud Barzani, Jalal Talabani and Abul Aziz Hakim -- has been named at the head of the Iraqi Interim Authority.
and:
The Interim Authority has formed a joint command that will oversee the military activities of the main militias in the opposition which have been placed at the disposal of a US marines general, based in Kurdistan to oversee a northern front. It has also named 14 new committees to take control of important ministries in Baghdad as soon as the allied military command turns over power to a civilian authority.
The article speculates that the front-runner to succeed Saddam is Iraqi National Congress head, Ahmad Chalabi:
Powerful Pentagon sponsors of Ahmed Chalabi, the head of the Iraqi National Congress, have promoted the Shia banker as the obvious candidate to replace Saddam Hussein. Opposition from the State Department has faded since the launch of military action, said Mr Musawi, Mr Chalabi’s deputy and spokesman. Still, he conceded that the White House has still not signed up to the opposition scheme for a quick transfer of power.
Here's a story from the New York Times suggesting that Saddam has been reading his Stalingrad lessons.
The lead in:
But the Iraqi private with a bullet wound in the back of his head suggested something unusually grim. Up and down the 200-mile stretch of desert where the American and British forces have advanced, one Iraqi prisoner after another has told captors a similar tale: that many Iraqi soldiers were fighting at gunpoint, threatened with death by tough loyalists of President Saddam Hussein.
The lead in:
But the Iraqi private with a bullet wound in the back of his head suggested something unusually grim. Up and down the 200-mile stretch of desert where the American and British forces have advanced, one Iraqi prisoner after another has told captors a similar tale: that many Iraqi soldiers were fighting at gunpoint, threatened with death by tough loyalists of President Saddam Hussein.
Postwar Iraq?
Al-Hayat will publish an interview tomorrow with Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, in which he apparently says (based on a tidbit in today's paper) that Iraqi opposition figures from both inside and outside Iraq will make up the basis of any transitional government, which the U.S. will attempt to set up as soon as possible after removal of Saddam's regime. He reportedly stressed that Iraqis would choose their government, and that any effort by the U.S. and its allies to appoint a governor in Iraq would most probably fail.
This seems to be a far cry from the U.S. military government option which the Iraq opposition heard from Zalmay Khalilzad at a meeting in Ankara in February. It seems to confirm what Kanan Makiya mentioned (in an earlier March 20 posting), namely that he had heard from the Pentagon's Douglas Feith,
... that the Bush administration had discreetly abandoned its military government plan and decided to reaffirm the United States' decade-old alliance with the opposition.
Are we missing something? So, what is Jay Garner's (the head of the postwar U.S. civilil administration) role anyway? And how credible will the opposition be given the possibility that the U.S. may have to impose a new regime with far more force than it had anticipated?
Postscript: In his press conference with Tony Blair, Bush essentially said the same thing as Armitage.
Al-Hayat will publish an interview tomorrow with Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, in which he apparently says (based on a tidbit in today's paper) that Iraqi opposition figures from both inside and outside Iraq will make up the basis of any transitional government, which the U.S. will attempt to set up as soon as possible after removal of Saddam's regime. He reportedly stressed that Iraqis would choose their government, and that any effort by the U.S. and its allies to appoint a governor in Iraq would most probably fail.
This seems to be a far cry from the U.S. military government option which the Iraq opposition heard from Zalmay Khalilzad at a meeting in Ankara in February. It seems to confirm what Kanan Makiya mentioned (in an earlier March 20 posting), namely that he had heard from the Pentagon's Douglas Feith,
... that the Bush administration had discreetly abandoned its military government plan and decided to reaffirm the United States' decade-old alliance with the opposition.
Are we missing something? So, what is Jay Garner's (the head of the postwar U.S. civilil administration) role anyway? And how credible will the opposition be given the possibility that the U.S. may have to impose a new regime with far more force than it had anticipated?
Postscript: In his press conference with Tony Blair, Bush essentially said the same thing as Armitage.
With the sergeant
This quote has made the email round today:
I've been all the way through this desert from Basra to here and I ain't seen one shopping mall or fast food restaurant. These people got nothing. Even in a little town like ours of twenty five hundred people you got a McDonald's at one end and a Hardee's at the other.
This was said by a Sgt. Sprague, from White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia.
The literati are cackling, but I'm on Sprague's side. First off, he probably saw plenty of fast-food restaurants in Kuwait; but if not he could have stepped into Saudi Arabia next door, or come here to Beirut to see plenty more. We Arabs love malls and fast-food outlets, so to sell the sentence as an example of Sprague's cultural idiocy is hypocritical. Once the Iraqis get malls and fast-food outlets to replace the building-sized portraits of Saddam, it will probably mean they will have been freed.
This quote has made the email round today:
I've been all the way through this desert from Basra to here and I ain't seen one shopping mall or fast food restaurant. These people got nothing. Even in a little town like ours of twenty five hundred people you got a McDonald's at one end and a Hardee's at the other.
This was said by a Sgt. Sprague, from White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia.
The literati are cackling, but I'm on Sprague's side. First off, he probably saw plenty of fast-food restaurants in Kuwait; but if not he could have stepped into Saudi Arabia next door, or come here to Beirut to see plenty more. We Arabs love malls and fast-food outlets, so to sell the sentence as an example of Sprague's cultural idiocy is hypocritical. Once the Iraqis get malls and fast-food outlets to replace the building-sized portraits of Saddam, it will probably mean they will have been freed.
Wednesday, March 26, 2003
Having (cautiously) posted a link to a Russian website reproducing reports allegedly based on material from Russian military intelligence, two people whose views I respect have compared it to the Israeli Debka.file, a website offering a compilation of sensationalistic articles, half-truths, and propaganda--and all that before you tuck into the lies.
Be warned.
Be warned.
News on BBC radio that Turkey has sent members of the hated Kurdish village guard into Iraq. The guard, effectively a Turkish army proxy force, was known for committing crimes against fellow Kurds suspected of collaboration with the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). The tone of the report underlined that these were precisely not the people to send into Iraq at present.
From Beirut news of more antiwar demonstrations, with an estimated 7,000 (according to the Daily Star) protesting yesterday. Monday evening, a stick of dynamite damaged a wall outside the (temporarily closed) British Council.
Interestingly, yesterday was also the first day of protest in Damascus (as opposed to inside the Yarmouq Palestinian refugee camp)--interesting because it took an awful long time for the Syrians to get riled up since the outbreak of war last week. This was inevitable, though, after a 50-country combined gross domestic product of approximately $22 trillion coalition aircraft fired at a Syrian bus in Iraq, killing several people.
Meanwhile, I read with sorrow that an April 1 press conference to launch the Annual Congress of the Lebanese Society of Family Medicine has been postponed, because no one plans to show up. The date says it all.
Interestingly, yesterday was also the first day of protest in Damascus (as opposed to inside the Yarmouq Palestinian refugee camp)--interesting because it took an awful long time for the Syrians to get riled up since the outbreak of war last week. This was inevitable, though, after a 50-country combined gross domestic product of approximately $22 trillion coalition aircraft fired at a Syrian bus in Iraq, killing several people.
Meanwhile, I read with sorrow that an April 1 press conference to launch the Annual Congress of the Lebanese Society of Family Medicine has been postponed, because no one plans to show up. The date says it all.
Have just settled into my pew to read Condoleezza Rice's opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal-Opinion Journal. Let's see, she says here that 50 countries have joined forces against Saddam (that includes Palau, by the way)--though only two seem to be sending corpses home.
She writes, of the coalition:
To put this in perspective, the combined population of coalition countries is approximately 1.23 billion people, with a combined gross domestic product of approximately $22 trillion. These countries are from every continent on the globe, representing every major race, religion, and ethnicity in the world.
Then, she quotes herself, taking a paragraph out of the National Security Strategy:
But, vitally, all have the will to face the gravest threat of our time--the nexus between outlaw regimes, weapons of mass destruction, and terrorism. The world has seen what happens when countries that recognize emerging or present threats lack the will to meet them.
Then this biscuit:
As the war progresses, and the situation on the ground evolves, the roles of many coalition members will grow. The farther coalition forces move into Iraq, the more need there will be for various specialized teams. And the more security improves, the more quickly relief and reconstruction efforts will be able to proceed into more parts of Iraq, with more coalition personnel providing essential services.
And finally:
Together, we are determined to do all we can to prevent Saddam Hussein, or terrorists with his weapons, from repeating September 11 on a vaster scale.
Maybe I just find Rice too pious by a half, but isn't she selling us swampland in Florida here? For one thing, who cares what the combined GDP of the coalition of the willing is? Saddam merits being removed by even the most wretched of economies. And that line about the role of coalition members growing, it’s not like anybody is lining up to send cannon fodder into Iraq, though they might cock an ear if reconstruction contracts come their way (but Rice didn’t quite promise that).
And that link between Saddam and September 11…He’s a jerk and we all await his departure with impatience, but the administration has got to stop using that nonexistent link with Al-Qaida. Saddam was always a fairly parochial thug, limiting himself to the immediate neighborhood.
She writes, of the coalition:
To put this in perspective, the combined population of coalition countries is approximately 1.23 billion people, with a combined gross domestic product of approximately $22 trillion. These countries are from every continent on the globe, representing every major race, religion, and ethnicity in the world.
Then, she quotes herself, taking a paragraph out of the National Security Strategy:
But, vitally, all have the will to face the gravest threat of our time--the nexus between outlaw regimes, weapons of mass destruction, and terrorism. The world has seen what happens when countries that recognize emerging or present threats lack the will to meet them.
Then this biscuit:
As the war progresses, and the situation on the ground evolves, the roles of many coalition members will grow. The farther coalition forces move into Iraq, the more need there will be for various specialized teams. And the more security improves, the more quickly relief and reconstruction efforts will be able to proceed into more parts of Iraq, with more coalition personnel providing essential services.
And finally:
Together, we are determined to do all we can to prevent Saddam Hussein, or terrorists with his weapons, from repeating September 11 on a vaster scale.
Maybe I just find Rice too pious by a half, but isn't she selling us swampland in Florida here? For one thing, who cares what the combined GDP of the coalition of the willing is? Saddam merits being removed by even the most wretched of economies. And that line about the role of coalition members growing, it’s not like anybody is lining up to send cannon fodder into Iraq, though they might cock an ear if reconstruction contracts come their way (but Rice didn’t quite promise that).
And that link between Saddam and September 11…He’s a jerk and we all await his departure with impatience, but the administration has got to stop using that nonexistent link with Al-Qaida. Saddam was always a fairly parochial thug, limiting himself to the immediate neighborhood.
Is the U.S. invasion force in Iraq too small? Some military men are saying so in this article from the Washington Post.
One of the people quoted is retired Army Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey, who knows about big forces: you'll recall he mowed down a big Iraqi column after the 1991 invasion of Kuwait, prompting a critical article by Seymour Hersh in the New Yorker.
One of the people quoted is retired Army Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey, who knows about big forces: you'll recall he mowed down a big Iraqi column after the 1991 invasion of Kuwait, prompting a critical article by Seymour Hersh in the New Yorker.
Thanks to an email list I belong to, I received this link to a Pentagon news release:
It reads:
The Department of Defense has designated the Army as Executive Agent for implementing plans to extinguish oil well fires and to assess the damage to oil facilities during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
The plan, which was turned over to the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), encompasses the full range of activities that might be necessary to restore or continue the operation of the Iraqi oil infrastructure, which is of vital importance to the future health of Iraq's economy.
To carry out this mission, the Corps will rely in large part on contractors with the needed expertise and specialized resources. In the initial phase, the Corps' prime contractor will be Kellogg, Brown & Root, of Houston, which prepared the contingency plans for the government under the Army Field Support Command's Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP).
The Corps will perform a variety of activities, including extinguishing oil well fires and assessing damage to oil facilities, and is prepared to clean up oil spills or other environmental damage at oil facilities. It also will perform engineering design and repair or reconstruction of damaged infrastructure, operate facilities, and distribute products, if required.
For further information, contact Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers at 202-761-0014 or 202-761-0011. For information on contracting contact the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Contracting Office at 866-461-5171.
It reads:
The Department of Defense has designated the Army as Executive Agent for implementing plans to extinguish oil well fires and to assess the damage to oil facilities during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
The plan, which was turned over to the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), encompasses the full range of activities that might be necessary to restore or continue the operation of the Iraqi oil infrastructure, which is of vital importance to the future health of Iraq's economy.
To carry out this mission, the Corps will rely in large part on contractors with the needed expertise and specialized resources. In the initial phase, the Corps' prime contractor will be Kellogg, Brown & Root, of Houston, which prepared the contingency plans for the government under the Army Field Support Command's Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP).
The Corps will perform a variety of activities, including extinguishing oil well fires and assessing damage to oil facilities, and is prepared to clean up oil spills or other environmental damage at oil facilities. It also will perform engineering design and repair or reconstruction of damaged infrastructure, operate facilities, and distribute products, if required.
For further information, contact Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers at 202-761-0014 or 202-761-0011. For information on contracting contact the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Contracting Office at 866-461-5171.
The Bush administration is reporting (paragraphs are from a New York Times article):
Some of the Army mechanics captured on Sunday after they took a wrong turn in the Iraqi town of Nasiriya were apparently executed by their captors, probably in front of townspeople, American officials charged tonight.
The officials cautioned that the information was based on one source, apparently a communications intercept, and that they were seeking corroborating evidence. It is unclear how many of the seven soldiers were executed, rather than killed in fighting, as the Iraqis contend. Five other Americans were taken prisoner and at least three were still missing.
Some of the Army mechanics captured on Sunday after they took a wrong turn in the Iraqi town of Nasiriya were apparently executed by their captors, probably in front of townspeople, American officials charged tonight.
The officials cautioned that the information was based on one source, apparently a communications intercept, and that they were seeking corroborating evidence. It is unclear how many of the seven soldiers were executed, rather than killed in fighting, as the Iraqis contend. Five other Americans were taken prisoner and at least three were still missing.
Collateral damage from the bombing of Iraqi Television: Al-Jazeera no longer enjoys a comparative advantage as main satellite portal to Saddam's media.
Tuesday, March 25, 2003
Readers might be interested in this English part of a Russian website called www.iraqwar.ru.
The website notes:
The IRAQWAR.RU analytical center was created recently by a group of journalists and military experts from Russia to provide accurate and up-to-date news and analysis of the war against Iraq.
The information is allegedly based on Russian military intelligence reports. You might want to treat it with some caution, though several items in this report, including doubts about the surrender of the 51st Iraqi Division, were subsequently shown to be true.
The website notes:
The IRAQWAR.RU analytical center was created recently by a group of journalists and military experts from Russia to provide accurate and up-to-date news and analysis of the war against Iraq.
The information is allegedly based on Russian military intelligence reports. You might want to treat it with some caution, though several items in this report, including doubts about the surrender of the 51st Iraqi Division, were subsequently shown to be true.
In the latest news on the supposed uprising in Basra, a British officer has been quoted as saying that the uprising was "in its infancy". Sounds like a slight step down from earlier reports.
It's pouring in Basra.
It's pouring in Basra.
Thief of Washington
So the cat is out of the bag. Bush has asked Congress for approval of supplemental spending worth almost $75bn to fund the war in Iraq and the war against terrorism, and, if I heard him correctly, reconstruction in a free Iraq.
This merely proves what a deuce of liars both Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz really are. Back in February, Wolfowitz, in an appearance before a congressional committee, pooh-poohed estimates that wartime spending would be anywhere near the $80-90bn figure that was being bandied about then (while all the time refusing to offer a more realistic estimate); Rumsfeld, meanwhile, was quoted two weeks ago as denying that the American taxpayer would foot the bill for rebuilding Iraq.
While Bush’s spending priorities were deliberately vague (he basically sold his request as a means of re-supplying the armed forces with munitions and gasoline), it is fairly clear what is being done: the administration is using the unity around the war to shove an outrageously expensive spending package through Congress, at a time of recession, without having even prepared the American public for such a financial sacrifice.
One awaits the 2004 election with bated breath.
So the cat is out of the bag. Bush has asked Congress for approval of supplemental spending worth almost $75bn to fund the war in Iraq and the war against terrorism, and, if I heard him correctly, reconstruction in a free Iraq.
This merely proves what a deuce of liars both Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz really are. Back in February, Wolfowitz, in an appearance before a congressional committee, pooh-poohed estimates that wartime spending would be anywhere near the $80-90bn figure that was being bandied about then (while all the time refusing to offer a more realistic estimate); Rumsfeld, meanwhile, was quoted two weeks ago as denying that the American taxpayer would foot the bill for rebuilding Iraq.
While Bush’s spending priorities were deliberately vague (he basically sold his request as a means of re-supplying the armed forces with munitions and gasoline), it is fairly clear what is being done: the administration is using the unity around the war to shove an outrageously expensive spending package through Congress, at a time of recession, without having even prepared the American public for such a financial sacrifice.
One awaits the 2004 election with bated breath.
According to CNN, British forces are reporting that a popular revolt against Saddam’s regime has started in Basra. An ITN reporter reportedly saw or heard Iraqi forces use mortars to suppress the revolt.
The Baath regime’s efforts to co-opt Shiite religious symbolism is both fascinating and sinister. As you might have read in the previous posting, an Iraqi spokesman claimed an Apache helicopter was downed near Kerbala because the pilot was packing whiskey. Kerbala is a holy Shiite site, and is the place where Hussein, the son of Imam Ali, was killed by a superior Sunni Ummayad force in 680.
The martyrdom of Hussein is a defining moment in Shiism, and is often associated with heroism (amid the certainty of death) against greater odds.
If this effort by the regime to claim Hussein as its own was not enough, yesterday, the London-based Al-Hayat wrote: "Analysts [believe it possible] that the Iraqi regime intends to turn Kerbala into the major area of confrontation [against U.S. forces], since it captures the spirit of the Iraqi regime, which aspires to inject [both] Islamic and Arab meaning and resonance into its war against the U.S."
If the paper is correct, then what we have is a secular Sunni-led regime filching Shiite religious symbolism--surely one of the more bizarre features of this war.
Think of that when you read the later posting above.
The martyrdom of Hussein is a defining moment in Shiism, and is often associated with heroism (amid the certainty of death) against greater odds.
If this effort by the regime to claim Hussein as its own was not enough, yesterday, the London-based Al-Hayat wrote: "Analysts [believe it possible] that the Iraqi regime intends to turn Kerbala into the major area of confrontation [against U.S. forces], since it captures the spirit of the Iraqi regime, which aspires to inject [both] Islamic and Arab meaning and resonance into its war against the U.S."
If the paper is correct, then what we have is a secular Sunni-led regime filching Shiite religious symbolism--surely one of the more bizarre features of this war.
Think of that when you read the later posting above.
From the "God is on our side" files. An Iraqi military spokesman, commenting on the forced landing of an American Apache helicopter, had this to say when explaining the reason: he observed that the Iraqis had found a bottle of whiskey inside belonging to one of the pilots. As the helicopter was at the time flying near the Holy Shiite city of Karbala, he continued, this unholy mix of alcohol and holiness ensured the Apache would fall to the ground:
"How could this Apache not fall when there was a bottle of whiskey inside, as it was flying over a holy city" (or something to that effect).
Funny, Iraqi TV has spent the last two days reporting that an old peasant with a vintage 1800 rifle had shot the thing down.
"How could this Apache not fall when there was a bottle of whiskey inside, as it was flying over a holy city" (or something to that effect).
Funny, Iraqi TV has spent the last two days reporting that an old peasant with a vintage 1800 rifle had shot the thing down.
Real Turkeys
While Americans continue to fulminate against France, it strikes me that the real culprit here is Turkey. Had it allowed U.S. forces through its territory, this would have been a two-front war. I can only wonder at how splendidly the Turks screwed up their relationship with the U.S., losing (a) money (b) a chance to shape postwar Iraq (c) a chance to curb Kurdish aspirations (d) a chance to become a cornerstone of a new American order in the Midde East and (e) U.S. support for Turkey's entry into the EU--and all for virtually nothing.
Perhaps the generals are patiently watching this and hoping it will, in the end, weaken Erdogan.
While Americans continue to fulminate against France, it strikes me that the real culprit here is Turkey. Had it allowed U.S. forces through its territory, this would have been a two-front war. I can only wonder at how splendidly the Turks screwed up their relationship with the U.S., losing (a) money (b) a chance to shape postwar Iraq (c) a chance to curb Kurdish aspirations (d) a chance to become a cornerstone of a new American order in the Midde East and (e) U.S. support for Turkey's entry into the EU--and all for virtually nothing.
Perhaps the generals are patiently watching this and hoping it will, in the end, weaken Erdogan.
Now is a good time to reflect on the fate of the Iraqi opposition, in light of the visible resistance by Iraqis to the coalition invasion. Given this, how seriously can one consider (a) a postwar opposition-based government that will have any measure of popularity? And (b) if the U.S. recognizes this, how would its presumed alternative, a military government, fare?
Will the U.S., in order to cut this Gordian Knot do what several opposition figures dread: establish a military government, but use Baath Party administrators to run it?
The London-based daily Al-Sharq al-Awsat reported yesterday that retired U.S. General Jay Garner, who will head the civil administration in Iraq, is still cooling his heals in Kuwait. Bet he's wondering what to do next.
Will the U.S., in order to cut this Gordian Knot do what several opposition figures dread: establish a military government, but use Baath Party administrators to run it?
The London-based daily Al-Sharq al-Awsat reported yesterday that retired U.S. General Jay Garner, who will head the civil administration in Iraq, is still cooling his heals in Kuwait. Bet he's wondering what to do next.
Readers might be interested in my weekly review (mostly) of the Middle East press for the Slate International Papers column, at least those of you who didn't make it here through the Slate link.
My friend Joe Bahout (whose elegant ruminations were picked up by Tim Cavanaugh in a Reason link on an earlier posting) sends in an interesting item on the disappearance of Uday, reminding me that Antoine Sfeir, a Lebanese analyst living in Paris, recently told French satellite station LCI that Saddam had dispatched Uday, probably to a former Soviet republic (in exchange for money). Why? Who knows, though Uday's mental state is a source of some merriment.
Perhaps, Joe suggests, Saddam didn't want a repeat of the Nepalese royal family murders: Uday flipping and blasting away at everybody else in the bunker.
Perhaps, Joe suggests, Saddam didn't want a repeat of the Nepalese royal family murders: Uday flipping and blasting away at everybody else in the bunker.
William Saletan has written a concise piece on Iraq's use of human shields in Slate, putting my earlier posting on the matter to shame. Just to clarify, I was asking the question with respect to actually pushing civilians into an area between Iraqi and U.S. forces, as opposed to firing from civilian areas (Saletan, legitimately, makes no distinction, nor does international law).
However, it was this type of situation that CNN's Walter Rodgers was describing in a report yesterday, and about which a reporter asked Gen. Tommy Franks; both of which led to my posting.
However, it was this type of situation that CNN's Walter Rodgers was describing in a report yesterday, and about which a reporter asked Gen. Tommy Franks; both of which led to my posting.
Monday, March 24, 2003
Given my continued interest in Gen. Nizar Khazraji, who recently escaped from a war crimes investigation in Denmark, I am wondering whether he is one of those being surreptitiously used by the U.S. to contact his former colleagues in the Iraqi army, in order to persuade them to come over to the coalition side.
Somehow, nobody has picked up on that story.
Somehow, nobody has picked up on that story.
Where is Uday?
A curiosity I haven't been able to explain. The Fedayeen Saddam units that are fighting the U.S. and U.K. forces so robustly in the south are under the nominal leadership of Uday, Saddam's son. Yet we haven't seen Uday in any of the footage released by the Iraqis, when everything about this situation invites parading him before the cameras, next to his brother Qusay, both heroes to Iraqi nationalism.
Does that mean he's dead?
A curiosity I haven't been able to explain. The Fedayeen Saddam units that are fighting the U.S. and U.K. forces so robustly in the south are under the nominal leadership of Uday, Saddam's son. Yet we haven't seen Uday in any of the footage released by the Iraqis, when everything about this situation invites parading him before the cameras, next to his brother Qusay, both heroes to Iraqi nationalism.
Does that mean he's dead?
Al-Jazeera has just shown footage taken from Iraqi television of two captured Apache helicopter pilots. They looked in good health, and one was drinking water. The official Iraqi story is that someone firing an old rifle shot them down, but that might be taken with a hefty grain of salt--though footage of the downed helicopter did not show major damage, so a lucky bullet might have scored.
Just a thought on showing POWs on television: while we can all agree that parading them in front of the cameras is in bad taste, aside from very likely being against international law, there may be an upside, at least from the U.S. perspective.
First of all, if the prisoners are not mistreated--and the Iraqis did not mistreat the batch captured yesterday or the two pilots taken today before the camera (though who can tell what happened off camera?)--then it is a way of ensuring they are alive. Better that than (a) being uncertain as to what happened to them and (b) sending out search parties to find them, which might divert resources. One thing to recognize, also, is that the Iraqis, by showing POWs publicly, become in a way responsible for them in the eyes of the world.
If being put in front of a camera is the worst the Iraqis do, then fine. If only it stays that way.
Just a thought on showing POWs on television: while we can all agree that parading them in front of the cameras is in bad taste, aside from very likely being against international law, there may be an upside, at least from the U.S. perspective.
First of all, if the prisoners are not mistreated--and the Iraqis did not mistreat the batch captured yesterday or the two pilots taken today before the camera (though who can tell what happened off camera?)--then it is a way of ensuring they are alive. Better that than (a) being uncertain as to what happened to them and (b) sending out search parties to find them, which might divert resources. One thing to recognize, also, is that the Iraqis, by showing POWs publicly, become in a way responsible for them in the eyes of the world.
If being put in front of a camera is the worst the Iraqis do, then fine. If only it stays that way.
The Washington Post is reporting, in a very interesting story by Walter Pincus:
Senior U.S. and foreign officials say their belief that Saddam Hussein was seriously wounded in a U.S. attack Thursday is primarily based on intercepted telephone calls of Iraqis living around the suburban Baghdad complex where he and his two sons were sleeping that morning and on reports from other Iraqis in contact with U.S. intelligence who claim to have been on the scene.
A senior administration official and a foreign official later said that some intelligence, including the story that Hussein was carried out of the building on a stretcher, came from U.S. operatives who listened in on phone calls made by Baghdad neighbors who witnessed the aftermath of the attack.
The story goes on to suggest that the U.S. military is in close contact with some Iraqi units, who are waiting to see how the wind blows before deciding to turn against Saddam or not.
On the attack against Saddam, I'm beginning to wonder what has become of Izzat Ibrahim, the third man in the triptych mentioned in an earlier post (which included Ibrahim, Ali Hassan al-Majid, and Taha Yassin Ramadan) of Iraqi officials who were supposedly killed. Indications are that Ali Hassan al-Majid is alive, and Ramadan was on TV yesterday, but Ibrahim has indeed disappeared.
Is he the one who didn't make it?
Senior U.S. and foreign officials say their belief that Saddam Hussein was seriously wounded in a U.S. attack Thursday is primarily based on intercepted telephone calls of Iraqis living around the suburban Baghdad complex where he and his two sons were sleeping that morning and on reports from other Iraqis in contact with U.S. intelligence who claim to have been on the scene.
A senior administration official and a foreign official later said that some intelligence, including the story that Hussein was carried out of the building on a stretcher, came from U.S. operatives who listened in on phone calls made by Baghdad neighbors who witnessed the aftermath of the attack.
The story goes on to suggest that the U.S. military is in close contact with some Iraqi units, who are waiting to see how the wind blows before deciding to turn against Saddam or not.
On the attack against Saddam, I'm beginning to wonder what has become of Izzat Ibrahim, the third man in the triptych mentioned in an earlier post (which included Ibrahim, Ali Hassan al-Majid, and Taha Yassin Ramadan) of Iraqi officials who were supposedly killed. Indications are that Ali Hassan al-Majid is alive, and Ramadan was on TV yesterday, but Ibrahim has indeed disappeared.
Is he the one who didn't make it?
Circular confirmation?
Gen. Tommy Franks has been speaking to the press corps in Qatar. One topic was the human shields the Iraqis have allegedly been using, made up of civilians. While that regime of thugs is capable of far worse, has there actually been any evidence of human shields?
Franks then said that "embedded" journalists (why does "embedded" sound like "in bed with"?) had confirmed it.
Perhaps they did and I missed that, but the last I heard on the topic was when CNN's Walter Rodgers was heading northwards towards Karbala. He cited soldiers with whom he was riding to confirm his claim. Was Franks citing Rodgers citing Franks' soldiers?
Gen. Tommy Franks has been speaking to the press corps in Qatar. One topic was the human shields the Iraqis have allegedly been using, made up of civilians. While that regime of thugs is capable of far worse, has there actually been any evidence of human shields?
Franks then said that "embedded" journalists (why does "embedded" sound like "in bed with"?) had confirmed it.
Perhaps they did and I missed that, but the last I heard on the topic was when CNN's Walter Rodgers was heading northwards towards Karbala. He cited soldiers with whom he was riding to confirm his claim. Was Franks citing Rodgers citing Franks' soldiers?
This Washington Post article suggests the U.S. is re-examining its war strategy in Iraq in light of yesterday's losses.
U.S. aircraft apparently fired at a Syrian bus Sunday morning, killing five and injuring ten, according to Syria's SANA news agency. It's not clear why it took more than a day for the news to emerge, though the location may have delayed information: the bus was reportedly hit inside Iraq near the Syrian border.
Reports from a participant on a specialized email list I belong to suggest that Russian intelligence has reported (a) that the 51st Iraqi Division did not surrender (which Al-Jazeera confirmed, as noted in an earlier post), and more intriguingly, (b) that there has been much criticism of Gen. Tommy Franks at the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Reports just out that U.S. missiles accidentally hit Turkey will not help Franks' reputation. I would guess (as someone entirely unversed in tactics) that this string of bad luck will impose some change in the U.S. approach--not unlike what happened in Afghanistan, where, after weeks of limited strikes, the Pentagon ordered a dramatic upscaling in bombings. Remember that the limited strikes then were blamed by the Pentagon on Colin Powell, who did not want the Northern Alliance to enter Kabul too quickly.
Now it's the other way around.
Reports just out that U.S. missiles accidentally hit Turkey will not help Franks' reputation. I would guess (as someone entirely unversed in tactics) that this string of bad luck will impose some change in the U.S. approach--not unlike what happened in Afghanistan, where, after weeks of limited strikes, the Pentagon ordered a dramatic upscaling in bombings. Remember that the limited strikes then were blamed by the Pentagon on Colin Powell, who did not want the Northern Alliance to enter Kabul too quickly.
Now it's the other way around.
Sunday, March 23, 2003
Today was apparently the moment of truth for Donald Rumsfeld's strategy of military calibration--a sort of postmodern rehash of "flexible response". Given that U.S. forces suffered setbacks in Nasiriyya, there will no doubt be many at the Pentagon calling (privately) for a reconsideration of the current strategy favoring speed and the precise use of force, in favor of something approximating the Powell Doctrine, which means overwhelming force.
There is some irony here: Rumsfeld, who is regarded as a reactionary fire-eater in the Middle East, emerges as the moderate--someone who wants to use force sparingly to avoid casualties and advance postwar political interests by diminishing Iraqi resentment. The Powell-ites, who by association with the ever reluctant warrior Colin Powell are regarded as moderates, instead favor a carpet-bombing technique which ensures few U.S., but probably quite a few more Iraqi, casualties
Should the Iraqis hope Rumsfeld wins out?
There is some irony here: Rumsfeld, who is regarded as a reactionary fire-eater in the Middle East, emerges as the moderate--someone who wants to use force sparingly to avoid casualties and advance postwar political interests by diminishing Iraqi resentment. The Powell-ites, who by association with the ever reluctant warrior Colin Powell are regarded as moderates, instead favor a carpet-bombing technique which ensures few U.S., but probably quite a few more Iraqi, casualties
Should the Iraqis hope Rumsfeld wins out?
Al-Jazeera has interviewed the commander of Iraq's 51st Division, a Gen. Hashemi, who insisted that he had not surrendered to U.S. and British forces. This apparently confirmed earlier denials of a surrender by the Iraqi information minister, Muhammad Saeed al-Sahhaf. Up to now, by the way, CNN has not played the tape of the interview.
While Hashemi's alleged surrender may well have been part of the ongoing psychological war against the Iraqi army, this strategy does have a potentially negative backlash: in light of growing complaints in Qatar that U.S. Central Command is providing no information of substance whatsoever on the war, journalists may end up becoming so jaded that they will do what they should be doing, namely go out and search for information on their own, as opposed to swallowing whole what Tommy Franks and his deputies feed them.
While Hashemi's alleged surrender may well have been part of the ongoing psychological war against the Iraqi army, this strategy does have a potentially negative backlash: in light of growing complaints in Qatar that U.S. Central Command is providing no information of substance whatsoever on the war, journalists may end up becoming so jaded that they will do what they should be doing, namely go out and search for information on their own, as opposed to swallowing whole what Tommy Franks and his deputies feed them.
On its front page, the Lebanese left-wing daily Al-Safir is showing photographs of Iraqi dead in Basra, including a boy whose head was partly blown away. While this may be predictable for the paper, increasingly the Lebanese press, including the more centrist Al-Nahar, is reflecting in its headlines the outrage in other Arab countries, whereas before it tended to take more of an observer's role.
In its Saturday edition, the London-based daily Al-Hayat, citing a Kurdish parliamentarian, reported that the U.S. has established a command to manage northern Iraq, with Kurds as advisers. Kurdish forces will have to accept orders from the U.S. command. The paper also quoted the MP as saying that in light of Turkey's refusal to allow American forces access to northern Iraq, Washington's reliance on Kurdish forces has increased.
The paper also reported that Kurdish officials, who just returned from a meeting in Ankara with Turkish officials, stayed mum on what had taken place, though they did insist that Turkish entry into Iraq was inevitable. You might want to see this Washington Post article for developments in northern Iraq.
The paper also reported that Kurdish officials, who just returned from a meeting in Ankara with Turkish officials, stayed mum on what had taken place, though they did insist that Turkish entry into Iraq was inevitable. You might want to see this Washington Post article for developments in northern Iraq.
Al-Jazeera is showing footage from Iraqi television of several American prisoners, apparently from a maintenance unit, who were captured near Nasiriyya. Two of them, one a woman, were injured in the arms and legs.
The station is also showing footage of dead U.S. soldiers. While there has been much commentary on how the POWs will be treated, almost nothing has been said on how the dead were treated: some shots showed a grinning Iraqi moving the bodies around so that their faces would appear on camera.
Apparently, the U.S. authorities (or the networks) have refused to allow the scenes to be shown on television. Neither CNN nor the BBC has shown the footage.
The station is also showing footage of dead U.S. soldiers. While there has been much commentary on how the POWs will be treated, almost nothing has been said on how the dead were treated: some shots showed a grinning Iraqi moving the bodies around so that their faces would appear on camera.
Apparently, the U.S. authorities (or the networks) have refused to allow the scenes to be shown on television. Neither CNN nor the BBC has shown the footage.
Reports of antiwar demonstrations all over the world. That includes, of all places, Afghanistan and Vietnam.
Vietnam?!
Vietnam?!
Just out of curiosity, why does the BBC say, when turning to their correspondents in Baghdad, that they are "operating under some restrictions", and fail to do so when introducing their correspondents with U.S. and U.K. forces? Aren't both batches being robustly controlled by their minders? That would certainly seem to be the case from a reading of Howard Kurtz's Washington Post article of March 22 (which I can't link).
Iraq vice-president Taha Yassin Ramadan has appeared at a televised press conference, the second of a trio of Iraqi officials American spokesmen had declared killed in the Wednesday "decapitation attack." Yesterday, we posted a New York Times story suggesting that Ali Hassan al-Majid, another of the Iraqi officials declared dead, was, in fact, alive. The third man is Izzat Ibrahim.
Maybe he'll appear tomorrow. Splendid thugs all, none merits the publicity he's received.
Maybe he'll appear tomorrow. Splendid thugs all, none merits the publicity he's received.
The Basra reversal.
Being a television veteran of the second Gulf War of 1991, I can guess how much crap goes up on television and radio, before the information is denied or contradicted. The U.S. and U.K. ambitions for Basra fit into this category. Before the war started, the mainstream media cited U.S. officials to the effect that Basra would become a showcase of Iraqi resentment against the regime. The city was described as a priority target, since the television cameras would prove how opposed to Saddam the majority Shiite inhabitants of Basra were. It seemed obvious that, as in 1991, the inhabitants would revolt.
Now we learn that Basra is no longer a priority. Instead of taking the city over, American and British forces have decided to surround it, without going in. That seems to be because the Iraqis have actually fought back. So the armed forces prefer to fight in Baghdad (and hope that will make a Basra battle unnecessary), rather than enter into potentially debilitating street battles in what was thought to be a friendly city.
Being a television veteran of the second Gulf War of 1991, I can guess how much crap goes up on television and radio, before the information is denied or contradicted. The U.S. and U.K. ambitions for Basra fit into this category. Before the war started, the mainstream media cited U.S. officials to the effect that Basra would become a showcase of Iraqi resentment against the regime. The city was described as a priority target, since the television cameras would prove how opposed to Saddam the majority Shiite inhabitants of Basra were. It seemed obvious that, as in 1991, the inhabitants would revolt.
Now we learn that Basra is no longer a priority. Instead of taking the city over, American and British forces have decided to surround it, without going in. That seems to be because the Iraqis have actually fought back. So the armed forces prefer to fight in Baghdad (and hope that will make a Basra battle unnecessary), rather than enter into potentially debilitating street battles in what was thought to be a friendly city.
One can feel the mood significantly changing in Lebanon. Large demonstrations in Sidon, southern Lebanon, yesterday, including left-wing parties and Hizbullah. This reflects a broad consensus, since Hizbullah is not politically active in Sidon, a mostly Sunni town. I expect mobilization against the war to escalate as the Iraqis show signs of fight.
Once the Lebanese get involved, you know that the mood in the rest of the Arab world is infinitely more negative. Does it matter? If you're trying to sell democracy, yes.
Once the Lebanese get involved, you know that the mood in the rest of the Arab world is infinitely more negative. Does it matter? If you're trying to sell democracy, yes.
Here in Beirut the mood remains calm. There have been demonstrations against the war in Iraq, with a small group of some 300 demonstrators clashing yesterday with police near the U.S. embassy in the suburb of Awkar. The day before, according to the press, demonstrators attacked a British embassy building (though I frankly can't remember a British embassy building in that area). Beirut is not really a good example of how the Arab world is reacting, and demonstrations in Cairo, Gaza and Yemen in the past few days were more indicative of the mood in the Arab heartland
Interestingly, the Syrian authorities authorized an anti-American demonstration yesterday in the Palestinian refugee camp of Yarmuq near Damascus, and Syria's mufti has condemned the war, but there have been no demonstrations in the streets of Damascus or against the U.S. embassy.
For a revealing perspective on the mood in Lebanon, read Tim Cavanaugh's report on the Reason website.
Interestingly, the Syrian authorities authorized an anti-American demonstration yesterday in the Palestinian refugee camp of Yarmuq near Damascus, and Syria's mufti has condemned the war, but there have been no demonstrations in the streets of Damascus or against the U.S. embassy.
For a revealing perspective on the mood in Lebanon, read Tim Cavanaugh's report on the Reason website.
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